Florida Law Review
Volume 38

Issue 4

Article 1

September 1986

Mary Carter Agreements: An Assesment of Attempted Solutions
June F. Entman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
June F. Entman, Mary Carter Agreements: An Assesment of Attempted Solutions, 38 Fla. L. Rev. 521
(1986).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol38/iss4/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Entman: Mary Carter Agreements: An Assesment of Attempted Solutions

University of Florida Law Review
VOLUME XXXVIII

FALL

1986

NUMBER

4

MARY CARTER AGREEMENTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF
ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS
JUNE

I.

II.

F.

ENTMAN*

INTRODUCTION .............................................

522

ELIMINATING MARY CARTER AGREEMENTS ..........................

530

A.

Banning the Use of Mary Carter Agreements: Champery, Ethics and
Trial Fairness .........................................
1. Cham perty ........................................
2. Ethics ............................................
3. Trial Fairness ....................................
B. Applying Credit Rules to May Carter Agreements to Prevent Contribution and Indemnity for a Settling Tortfeasor ..............
C. Deterring Mary Carter Agreements by Allowing Contributionfor the
Nonsettling Party .......................................
D. Mar' Carter Agreements in a Tort System Without Joint and Several
Liability and Contribution ................................
III.

TOLERATING

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
IV.
V .

MARY CARTER AGREEMENTS .........................

Admissibility of the May Carter Agreement ..................
Disclosure of the Agreement ...............................
Separate Trials, Severance and Dismissal of the Settling Defendant
Conflicts Between Mary Carter Agreements and the Real Party in
Interest Rule ...........................................
Preserving the Nonsettling Defendants' Right to Remove the Case to
Federal Court ..........................................

SHOULD MARY CARTER AGREEMENTS

BE TOLERATED? .............

CONCLUSION . ..............................................

531
531
537
539
540
549
557
558
558
561
563
566
571
574
579

* Assistant Professor of Law, Memphis State University; B.A., 1967, Smith College; M.A.T.,
1969, University of Chicago; J.D., 1981, Memphis State University School of Law. I am grateful
for the assistance of Memphis State University School of Law Visiting Herff Chair Professors John
W. Wade and Robert T. Mann, who willingly read the final draft of this article and suggested
valuable improvements. Throughout the project, my colleague, Robert Banks, provided relentless
encouragement and thoughtful criticism, both of which I very much appreciate. I also thank my
student research assistants, Debra Davis and Randall Crossing, for their patient and careful work.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1986

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [1986], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
I.

[Vol. N-XXVIII

INTRODUCTION

For almost twenty years, a type of settlement agreement known as a "Mary
Carter agreement" ' has been a growing, but not widely recognized, problem
in civil litigation in the United States. Under a Mary Carter agreement, one
or more of the potentially liable obligors or tortfeasors2 guarantees the plaintiff
a specified recovery. The portion of the guaranteed amount ultimately paid by
the agreeing tortfeasor, however, depends upon the amount, if any, the plaintiff
recovers from other tortfeasors. 3 In some Mary Carter agreements, the guarantee
is merely expressed in an agreement between the parties, and no money is paid
until after the nonagreeing tortfeasor's liability is determined. 4 In others, the
settling tortfeasor gives the guaranteed amount to the plaintiff at the time of
the agreement as a loan without interest to be repaid only to the extent of the
plaintiff's recovery from other tortfeasors. This latter variation is frequently
1. The name derives from Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1967). California regulates Mary Carter agreements by statute and calls them "sliding scale recovery" agreements. See CAt.. Civ. PROC. CODE § 877.5 (West 1980); Comment, Sliding Scale
Agreements and the Good Faith Requirement of Settlement Negotiation, 12 PAC. L.J. 121 (1980) [hereinafter
Sliding Scale Agreements]. In Arizona, Mary Carter agreements are called "Gallagher" agreements.
See City of Tucson v. Gallagher, 108 Ariz. 140, 493 P.2d 1197 (1972); Note, Are Gallagher Covenants
Unethical?: An Analysis Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, 19 ARIZ. L. REv. 863 (1977);
Comment, Gallagher Covenants, Mary Carter Agreements and Loan Receipt Agreements: Unsettling Contributions
to Conflict Resolution, 1977 ARIz. ST. L.J. 117 [hereinafter Unsettling Contributions].
2. For convenience, the potentially liable obligors or tortfeasors entering into a Mary Carter
agreement will be referred to as the settling or agreeing tortfeasors.
3. Mary Carter agreements have been used in cases involving obligors other than tortfeasors.
See Corn Exch. Bank v. Tri-State Livestock Auction Co., 368 N.W.2d 596 (S.D. 1985); Record
v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 222 Tenn. 548, 438 S.W.2d 743 (1969); Comment, Settling Multiparty
Contract Disputes Through the Use of Loan Receipt Agreements, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 271 (1981). The
device appears most frequently, however, in judicial decisions involving joint tortfeasors.
Several commentators define Mary Carter agreements by delineating "elements" of such an
agreement. E.g., Comment, Mary Carter Agreements: A Viable Means of Settlement?, 14 TULSA L.J. 744,
754 & n.30 (1979). Some consider secrecy the essence of a Mary Carter agreement. Id.; Comment,
Is Mary Carter Alive and Well in Michigan?: Taking a Stand on Secret Settlements in Multiparty Tort Litigation,
1985 DES'. C.L. REV. 605, 607 [hereinafter Mary Carter in Mihigan]. While secrecy certainly exacerbates the problems caused by Mary Carter agreements, disclosure of the agreement does not
eliminate either the problems of litigation fairness, see infra § III., or the distortion of allocation
of liability among tortfeasors, see infra § II.B.-D., created by Mary Carter agreements. Thus, secrecy
is not a necessary part of a Mary Carter agreement. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 877.5(b) (West
1980) (quoted infra note 187); Comment, Mary Carter Agreements: Unfair and Unnecessary, 32 Sw. L.J.
779, 784 (1978) [hereinafter Unfair and Unnecessayy].
For the complete text of various Mary Carter agreements, see Booth v. Mary Carter Paint
Co., 202 So. 2d 8, 10-11 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1967); Burkett v. Crulo Trucking Co., 171 Ind. App.
166, 168-73, 355 N.E.2d 253, 254-58 (1976); General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 286 Md. 714,
719 n.1, 410 A.2d 1039, 1042 n.1 (1980); Lum v. Stinnett, 87 Nev. 402, 404, 488 P.2d 347, 348
(1971); Cox v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 594 P.2d 354, 355-56 (Okla. 1978); Grillo v. Burke's Paint
Co., 275 Or. 421, 424-25, 551 P.2d 449, 451 (1976); Jensen v. Beaird, 40 Wash. App. 1, 3-4
n.2, 696 P.2d 612, 614-15 n.2 (1985); Eubanks & Cocchiarella, In Defense of "Mary Carter," 26
FOR THE DEF., Feb. 1984, at 14, 26; Thornton & Wick, Loan Receipt Agreements: Are Thq Loans,
Settlements, Wagering Contracts, or Unholy Alliances?, 43 INS. CoUNs. J. 226, 238-39 (1976).
4. See, e.g., Lum v. Stinnett, 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971).
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denominated a "loan receipt" agreement, s which generates confusion because
loan receipts have long been used for different purposes in the insurance sub6
rogation context.
Mary Carter agreements received a great deal of attention from courts and
commentators during the 1970s, particularly in jurisdictions without contribution
among joint tortfeasors. 7 Mary Carter agreements are also used, however, in

5. See, e.g., Bolton v. Ziegler, 111 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Iowa 1953) ("loan receipt"); Palmer
v. Avco Distrib. Corp., 82 Ill. '2d 211, 412 N.E.2d 959 (1980) ("loan agreement"); Burkett v.
Crulo Trucking Co., 171 Ind. App. 166, 355 N.E.2d 253 (1976) ("Loan Agreement and Contractual
Promises of the Parties to the Loan"); Cullen v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 211 Kan. 368, 507
P.2d 353 (1973) ("loan receipt"); Grillo v. Burke's Paint Co., 275 Or. 421, 551 P.2d 449 (1976)
("Loan Receipt and Covenant Not to Execute"). The "loan" or "advance" feature is sometimes
present in agreements referred to as simply "Mary Carter." See Shelton v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 281 Ark. 100, 662 S.W.2d 473 (1983); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex.
1978). In California, a sliding scale recovery agreement includes "agreements in the form of a
loan from the agreeing tortfeasor defendant to the plaintiff or plaintiffs which is repayable in whole
or in part from the recovery against the nonagreeing tortfeasor defendant." CAL. Civ. PROC. CoD
§ 877.5(b) (West 1980).
6. Some loan receipt agreements are not Mary Carter agreements. The term "loan receipt"
originally referred to a subrogation agreement in which an insurance company lent its insured the
amount of his loss. The loan was repayable to the extent of any recovery by the insured from
third persons. See Annotation, Insurance: Validity and Effect of Loan Receipt or Agreement Between Insured
and Insurer for a Loan Repayable to Extent of Insured's Recovery from Another, 13 A.L.R.3d 42 (1967).
By contrast, the Mary Carter loan receipt involves payment by the third party obligor or tortfeasor,
or its liability insurer, to the injured party. This important distinction is noted in the following
decisions: Bolton v. Ziegler, 111 F. Supp. 516, 530 (N.D. Iowa 1953); Reese v. Chicago, B. &
Q.R.R., 55 Ill.
2d 356, 361-62, 303 N.E.2d 382, 386 (1973); Cullen v. Atchinson, T. & S.F.
Ry., 211 Kan. 368, 375-76, 507 P.2d 353, 362-63 (1973); Monjay v. Evergreen School Dist. No.
114, 13 Wash. App. 654, 660 n.3, 537 P.2d 825, 829 n.3 (1975). See generally Lageson, Guarantee
and Loan Receipt Agreements in Multi-party Litigation, 42 J. AIR L. & COMMERCE 85 (1976); McKay,
Loan Agreement: A Settlement Device that Deserves Close Scurtiny, 10 VAL. U.L. REv. 231 (1976); Scoby,
Loan Receipts and Guaranty Agreements, 10 FORUM 1300 (1975); Thornton & Wick, supra note 3;
Annotation, Validity and Effect of "Loan Receipt" Agreement Between Injured Party and One Tortfeasor, for
Loan Repayable to Extent of Injured Party's Recovery from a Cotortfeasor, 62 A.L.R.3d 1111 (1975).
Unfortunately, courts sometimes fail to recognize a Mary Carter agreement and its unique
problems when the agreement is denominated with the more respectable name, "loan receipt." See
Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Otis, 145 Ind. App. 159, 176-81, 250 N.E.2d 378, 390-93 (1969)
(discussed in McKay, supra, at 258 n.98); Record v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 222 Tenn. 548,
438 S.W.2d 743 (1969) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 61-77); Freedman, The Expected
Demise of "Mary Carter". She Never Was Well!, 1975 INs. L.J. 602, 611-613.
More recently, a Minnesota court mistakenly treated a subrogation loan receipt as if it were
a Mary Carter agreement. In Riewe v. Arnesen, 381 N.W.2d 448 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), the
agreement at issue was between some of the defendant physicians and their insurer. The plaintiff's
claim was completely satisfied before trial and the case proceeded solely on the settling defendant's
crossclaim for contribution and indemnity against a codefendant physician. Thus, the trial did not
involve any agreement between a claimant and a codefendant or a codefendant's insurer. Nevertheless, in holding that the loan receipt agreement should have been admitted on cross-examination
of the settling defendants - crossclaimants, the court relied upon Pacific Indem. Co. v. ThompsonYaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977), a case involving a true Mary Carter agreement
between plaintiffs and two defendants. Riewe, 381 N.W.2d at 453-54.
7. See, e.g., Lum v. Stinnett, 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971); Monjay v. Evergreen
School Dist. No. 114, 14 Wash. App. 654, 660 n.3, 537 P.2d 825, 829 n.3 (1975); Michael, "Mary
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jurisdictions that do provide for contribution among joint tortfeasors.

In all

jurisdictions, Mary Carter agreements create significant problems of unfairness
to the nonsettling defendants. The following example illustrates the use and
effects of a Mary Carter agreement.
On a bright sunny day in Memphis, Tennessee, George pulled away from a
stop sign at a four-way-stop intersection without bringing his automobile to a complete stop. George was struck broadside by Martha's automobile, which had
entered the intersection from the cross street, also without first coming to a
stop. George and Martha were the only witnesses. Immediately after the accident,
a shaken Martha told George that she could not imagine how she had failed
to see the stop sign. Later, however, Martha took the position that she tried
to stop, but was unable to do so because her brakes had not responded properly.
The reason for this, according to Martha, was the negligence of Shade Tree
Mechanics, Inc. in failing to repair her brakes when she had taken her car to
Shade Tree in West Memphis, Arkansas, for brake work the week before the
accident.
George, a Tennessee citizen, brought suit in a Tennessee state court against
Martha, also a Tennessee citizen, and against Shade Tree Mechanics, Inc., an
Arkansas corporation. George sought $200,000 for his personal injuries incurred
in the accident.
Prior to trial, George entered into a Mary Carter agreement with Martha
and Martha's liability insurance carrier, which covered Martha for a limit of
$150,000 per accident. The agreement provided: (1) Martha would pay George
$50,000 and George would release Martha, but not Shade Tree, from all
claims and liability to George.9 (2) If George obtained a settlement or judgment
against Shade Tree for more than $50,000, Martha would not pay any amount
to George, but if George obtained a judgment against Shade Tree in an amount
less than $50,000, Martha would pay George only the difference between the
judgment against Shade Tree and $50,000. (3) George would not settle with

Carter" Agreements in Illinois, 64 ILL. B.J. 514 (1976); Note, supra note 1; Note, Settlement Devices
with Joint Tortfeasors, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 762 (1973); Note, "Mary Carter" Limitation on Liability
Agreements Between Adversary Parties: A Painted Lady is Exposed, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 988 (1974).
Arizona, Florida, Illinois, and Nevada, early sources of much Mary Carter litigation, have now
adopted contribution acts. Aaiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §5 12-2501 to -2509 (Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.31 (West Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § 302 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); NEv.
REV. STAT. §§ 17.225-.305 (1986).
8. See infra § II.0.
9. Sometimes the release is in the form of a covenant not to sue or a covenant not to
execute. See, e.g., Grillo v. Burke's Paint Co., 275 Or. 421, 551 P.2d 449 (1976). At one time,
the distinction among these devices was that a release given to one joint obligor or tortfeasor
released all. A covenant not to sue or to execute, however, released only the party to whom it

was given. Most jurisdictions have changed this common law rule to provide that none of thesc
devices releases other tortfeasors or obligors unless the parties intend to do so. See 3 F. HARPER,
F. JAMEs & 0. GRAY, ThE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1, at 32-39 (2d ed. 1986); W. PROSSER & W.
§ 49 (5th ed. 1984); UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT,
§ 4, 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975); see, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-106 (1980) (contract actions), § 2911-105(a)(1) (1980) (tort actions).
KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS
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Shade Tree for less than $50,000 without Martha's consent.1" (4) George would
proceed with the suit against Shade Tree, and Martha would remain a defendant
in that lawsuit.1 (5) The agreement between George and Martha would be
kept secret. 2
The Mary Carter agreement eliminated any actual controversy between
George and Martha and aligned their interests in favor of George obtaining a
judgment against Shade Tree of at least $50,000. Nevertheless, to the rest of
the world, the lawsuit appeared to be George v. Martha and Shade Tree. Shade
Tree, moreover, was unable to remove the case to federal court because of the
1 3
lack of diversity of citizenship between George and Martha.
Another effect of the Mary Carter agreement was that settlement overtures
Shade Tree might ordinarily make were useless. Martha, of course, was unwilling to contribute to any settlement fund. George would not consider any
offer from Shade Tree less than $50,000 and viewed the result of turning down
an offer of, for instance, $80,000 as placing only $30,000 at risk. Since, as far
as Shade Tree knew, George could have accepted $80,000 and still proceeded
4
against Martha, George's rejection of such an offer was baffling to Shade Tree.
10. The Mary Carter agreements in the following cases contained provisions penalizing the
plaintiflf if they settled with the nonagreeing defendant for less than a certain amount or without
the agreeing defendant's approval: Bass v. Phoenix Seadrill/78, Ltd., 749 F.2d 1154, 1156 (5th
Cir. 1985); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 511 (9th Cir. 1974); Thompson v.
Continental Emsco Co., 629 F. Supp. 1160, 1161 (S.D. Tex. 1986); Florow v. Louisville & N.R.R.
(In re Waverly Accident of February 22-24, 1978), 502 F. Supp. 1, 2 (M.D. Tenn. 1979); Abbott
Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1205,
-, 228 Cal. Rptr. 250, 253 (Ct. App.),
rwtew ranted, 709 P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1985); Lum v. Stinnett, 87 Nev. 402, 404, 488
P.2d 347, 348 (1971); Wright v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 63 N.C. App. 465, 467, 305 S.E.2d
190, 191 (1983); General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Tex. 1977) (overruled
on other grounds by 'Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. 1984)); Monjay v.
Evergreen School Dist. No. 114, 13 Wash. App. 654, 660, 537 P.2d 825, 826 (1975).
11. The Mary Carter agreements in the following cases contained such provisions: Maule
Indus., Inc. v. Rountree, 284 So. 2d 389, 390 (Fla. 1973) (agreeing defendants would "continue
in active defense of the litigation"); Grillo v. Burke's Paint Co., 275 Or. 421, 424, 551 P.2d 449,
451 (1976); Jensen v. Beaird, 40 Wash. App. 1, 3-4, 696 P.2d 612, 615 (1985).
12. See supra note 3.
13. See infra 5 III.E.
14. Se'e General Motors v. Lahocki, 286 Md. 714, 726, 410 A.2d 1039, 1045 (1980), in which
the court observed that the nonagreeing defendant could not bargain on the same basis as it might
have bargained had it known of the Mary Carter settlement. The court found that the plaintiffs
had an incentive not to settle with the nonagreeing defendant, because settlement would reduce
the amount they would receive from the agreeing defendant. In Marathon Oil Co. v. Mid-Continent
Underwriters, 786 F.2d 1301, 1304 (5th Cir. 1986), the court granted relief to Marathon, the
nonsettling defendant. Marathon had shown that, as a result of a Mary Carter agreement, it could
not -ettle the claim against it for less than $85,000, even though the plaintiff was willing to accept
a nct payment of $55,000 from Marathon. In Thompson v. Continental Emsco Co., 629 F. Supp.
1160, 1162 (S.D. Te%. 1986), the plaintiff refused to accept a settlement offer of $1,200,000 from
the nonagrecing defendant because another defendant, who was a party to a $900,000 Mary Carter
agrcement with the plaintiff, refused to reduce its "lien" on the plaintiff's recovery. See also Bass
v. Phoenix Seadrill/78, Ltd., 562 F. Supp. 790, 798-99 (E.D. Tex. 1983) (plaintiff received only
* small part of the value of his claim from the settling defendant, thus he was likely to demand
a larger settlement from the other defendants), rev'd, 749 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1985); Mustang

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1986

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [1986], Art. 1
526

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVIII

At trial, Shade Tree was the primary target of George's offense. Opening
and closing arguments by George's attorney focused on Shade Tree's negligence
and de-emphasized Martha's contribution in causing George's injuries.' 5 In his
testimony, George did not mention Martha's statement to him about failing to
see the stop sign. 16 Martha's testimony and the behavior of her attorney were
equally surprising. After George's attorney exhausted his peremptory challenges,
Martha's attorney used her peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors
that Shade Tree's attorney accepted and considered good for the defense. 7
Further, Martha did not plead George's contributory negligence as a defense
and she testified at trial that George came to a full stop before he entered the
intersection. 8 Generally, Martha's testimony bolstered George's case by em-

Equip., Inc. v. Welch, 115 Ariz. 376, 380, 565 P.2d 882, 886 (Ct. App. 1976) ("it is impossible
to say that settlement negotiations . . . might not have been different" if the Mary Carter agreement
had been disclosed), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 115 Ariz. 206, 210, 564 P.2d 895, 900 (1977) (en
banc); McKay, supra note 6, at 252 ("The non-agreeing codefendant is barred from settling out
of court by the very nature and contractual provisions of the loan receipt device."); Scoby, supra
note 6, at 1313 (plaintiff is "unable to consider an offer of additional sums by the remaining
defendants without regard for the 'debt' incurred to the lending defendant"); Unfair and Unnecessary,
supra note 3, at 786. But see Bass v. Phoenix Seadrill/78, Ltd., 749 F.2d 1154, 1164 n.18 (5th
Cir. 1985) ("We are not altogether convinced that the possibility of settlement with [nonagreeing
defendants] is rendered less likely, because of the veto provision, than it would have been if [agreeing
defendant] lacked the ability to reject settlements.").
15. See Lum v. Stinnett, 87 Nev. 402, 405-07, 488 P.2d 347, 348-49 (1971) (while a settling
defendant seemed the prime target of the complaint, plaintiff's counsel focused on the nonsettling
defendant in his opening statement, displaying sympathy toward the settling defendants).
16. See Ratterree v. Bartlett, 238 Kan. 11, 28, 707 P.2d 1063, 1075 (1985). In Ratterree,
plaintiff alleged in the petition and pretrial order that the settling defendant was negligent. Her
counsel, however, did not mention that defendant's negligence in opening argument. Plaintiff testified that the settling defendant "was not in the least bit negligent" and she did not object to
the settling defendant's motion for directed verdict. Id.
17. See Lubbock Mfg. Co. v. Perez, 591 S.W.2d 907, 920-22 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979) (allocation
of challenges not materially unfair despite Mary Carter agreements); Greiner v. Zinker, 573 S.W.2d
884, 885-86 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978) (error to grant settling defendants and plaintiff six strikes each;
neither crossed on any of the eighteen strikes); see, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. S 22-3-105 (1980). This
statute allocates four peremptory challenges each to a sole plaintiff and sole defendant and adds
four additional challenges, up to eight, to each side having more than one party. The trial court
in its discretion divides the eight challenges among the parties on the same side.
18. See Corn Exch. Bank v. Tri-State Livestock Auction Co., 368 N.W.2d 596, 599 (S.D.
1985) (testimony of owner of settling defendant, called by plaintiff as an "adverse" witness, did
not contradict plaintiff's position). An additional element of prejudice may arise if the nonagrecing
defendant (Shade Tree) is not permitted to treat the agreeing defendant (Martha) as an adverse
witness, thereby enabling the agreeing defendant to testify without cross-examination by the only
truly adverse party, the nonagreeing defendant. See Maule Indus., Inc. v. Rountree, 264 So. 2d
445, 448 (4th D.C.A. 1972) (trial judge did not permit nonagreeing defendant who called agreeing
defendant as a witness to impeach the witness on the basis of a prior inconsistent statement), revd,
284 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1973); Lum v. Stinnett, 87 Nev. 402, 405, 488 P.2d 347, 349 (1971). In
Lur, plaintiff's counsel called agreeing defendants as adverse parties and examined one with leading
questions. Plaintiff's counsel then opposed full cross-examination by nonagreeing defendant's counsel
on the ground his own interrogation was cross-examination. The court noted that the plaintiff thus
had the benefit of the settling defendant's testimony without being bound by it. Id.; cf. Lubbock
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phasizing the seriousness of the accident and of George's injuries. 19
The cross-examination of George and George's witnesses by Martha's attorney was unenthusiastic at best 20 and even seemed to enhance George's case
with regard to the extent of George's injuries. 2' In dosing argument, Martha's
attorney vigorously denied Martha's negligence but virtually admitted that George
was terribly injured. 22 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Martha and
against Shade Tree in the amount of $200,000.
Mfg. Co, v. Perez, 591 S.W.2d 907, 920 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979). In Lubbock, the trial judge ruled
that after Mary Carteg agreements were disclosed during trial, the nonagreeing defendant was
entitled to recall for examination and impeachment any witnesses previously examined by agreeing
defendant. Id.
19. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Little, 276 Ark. 511, 514, 639 S.W.2d 726, 728
(1982) (testimony of the settling defendants was critical to the plaintiff's case against the defendant
manufacturer of a tire rim to establish that the wheel introduced in evidence caused the plaintiff's
injuries); General Motors v. Lahocki, 286 Md. 714, 724, 410 A.2d 1039, 1044 (1980). In Lahocki,
the settling defendant bolstered plaintiff's case by filling in areas not covered and reiterating testimony harmful to nonsettling defendant. "In short, Contee did all in its power to see that the
plaintiffs obtained a verdict against GM." Id.; see also Hegarty v. Campbell Soup Co., 214 Neb.
716, 724, 335 N.W.2d 758, 764 (1983) (employees of settling defendant testified about seniority,
employees' salaries, and employees' benefits, matters relevant to the amount of damages the plaintiff
had suffered). In Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385, 387 (Fla. 1973), the court discussed the benefit
to the settling defendant in "painting a gruesome testimonial picture of the other defendant's
misconduct." But cf. City of Tucson v. Gallagher, 108 Ariz. 140, 142-43, 493 P.2d 1197, 1200
(1972) (en bane) (Mary Carter agreement did not affect settling defendant's testimony). Even absent
a Mary Carter agreement, an alleged joint tortfeasor, hoping for a favorable verdict against the
plaintiff, or at least contribution, will wish to place blame on another alleged joint tortfeasor. Never,
however, absent a Mary Carter agreement will the alleged joint tortfeasor wish to strengthen the
plaintiff's case with regard to the extent of damages or plaintiff's lack of fault. See Unfair and
Unnecessary, supra note 3, at 783-84.
20. Cf. City of Tucson v. Gallagher, 108 Ariz. 140, 143, 493 P.2d 1197, 1200 (1972) (en
banc). In Gallagher, the nonagreeing defendant complained that the agreeing defendant's counsel
asked only one question during the trial and did not cross-examine the plaintiff, or her doctor, or
her dentist. The court responded, "We know of no rule of law requiring cross-examination ....
[C]ross-examination frequently is harmful to the cross-examiner's case." Accord Bill Currie
Ford, Inc. v. Cash, 252 So. 2d 407 (2d D.C.A. 1971), cert. denied, 256 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1972);
Ratterree v. Bartlett, 238 Kan. 11, 707 P.2d 1063 (1985).
21. In General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 286 Md. 714, 724-26, 410 A.2d 1039, 1044-45
(1980), the court found that the settling defendant had cross-examined witnesses who, because of
the Mary Carter agreement, were not truly adverse. See also Lum v. Stinnett, 87 Nev. 402, 40506, 488 P.2d 347, 349 (1971) ("When [plaintiff's] counsel omitted to ask plaintiff's former employer
if [plaintiff] had received 'tips' as well as wages, [the settling defendant's] counsel went into this
item of special damage on cross-examination, in notable departure from his usual nonchalance.");
Unfair and Unnecessag, supra note 3, at 794 (discussing General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558
S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977), in which counsel for the settling defendants promoted plaintiff's cause
on cross-examination of plaintiff and the nonsettling defendant's expert witness); cf. Lubbock Mfg.
Co. v. Perez, 591 S.W.2d 907, 920 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979) (trial judge ruled that after Mary Carter
agreements were disclosed during trial, agreeing defendant could not cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses).
22. Maule Indus., Inc. v. Rountree, 264 So. 2d 445, 448 (4th D.C.A. 1972) (counsel for
agreeing defendants in dosing argument "candidly admitted that his clients were partly responsible
for the plaintiffs' damages and then devoted the major portion of his summation to showing that
appellants [nonagreeing defendants] were likewise partly responsible."), revd, 284 So. 2d 389 (Fla.
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After the verdict, Shade Tree learned about the Mary Carter agreement.
Shade Tree moved for a new trial on the ground that George had failed to
supplement an interrogatory, propounded to George by Shade Tree, asking
whether George had been compensated in any way by others for the injuries
sustained in the accident. Shade Tree argued that if it had known of the Mary
Carter agreement, it would have used the agreement to impeach both George
and Martha. 23 George argued that the Mary Carter agreement was not "compens.ation" and was not discoverable, 24 and that the trial was unaffected by the
nondisclosure because settlement agreements are not admissible for any purpose.
The trial judge reasoned that because Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-11105(b) provides, "No evidence of a release . . . received by another tortfeasor

... may be introduced by a defendant at the trial of an action by a claimant
for injury . . . ,,,2Shade Tree could not have introduced the agreement and,
therefore, was not prejudiced by the nondisclosure.
Shade Tree then moved for a reduction of the verdict by $50,00026 - the
value of the settlement between George and Martha. Because George never
actually received that amount from Martha, and would not receive any money
from Martha under the Mary Carter agreement, the trial court denied the
motion. Shade Tree also was not able to seek contribution from Martha because
the verdict in Martha's favor against George effectively barred such a claim. 27
1973); Corn Exch. Bank v. Tri-State Livestock Auction Co., 368 N.W.2d 596, 599 (S.D. 1985)
(settling defendant's counsel conceded in closing argument that plaintiff had made its case against
both his client and the nonsettling defendant); Degen v. Bayman, 86 S.D. 598, 607-08, 200 N.V.2d
134, 139 (1972). See Ratterree v. Bartlett, 238 Kan. 11, 28, 707 P.2d 1063, 1076 (1985). In
Ratterree, the agreeing defendant's counsel did not comment in opening statement about the validity
of plaintiff's damage claims, even though he was being sued for 3/4 million dollars; he did not
cross-examine one of plaintiff's damage witnesses and performed only limited cross-examination of
another; and in closing, he urged the jury to adequately compensate both himself and the plaintiff
and even commented on the extensiveness of the plaintiff's damages. Id. In the frequently-cited
Ponderosa Timber & Clearing Co. v. Emrich, 86 Nev. 625, 631-32, 472 P.2d 358, 362-63 (1970),
counsel for the settling defendant stated in closing argument, "Now I am not going to stand here
and make a fool of myself by telling you people that there is any merit in the defense of contributory
negligence. There isn't ....

of the oath
Johnson v.
to monitor
or without
23.

This is the kind of a case when a lawyer . . . has to remind himself

that he took when he was admitted to practice . . . to see that justice is done." Cf.
Moberg, 334 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Minn. 1983) ("The trial court, in the best position
the trial, was of the opinion that the final arguments would have been the same with
the settlement agreement and that the non-disclosure was not prejudicial.").

See infra § III.A.

24. See infra § III.B.
25. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-11-105(b) (1980) is a part of the "Uniform Contribution Among
Tort-Feasors Act" adopted in Tennessee in 1968. TENN. CODE AsN. § 29-11-101 (1980). Subsection
105(b), however, is not part of the Uniform Act. See UNIF. CONTRIBUTION ANMONGTORTF ASORS
AcT, § 4, 12 U.L.A. 98-100 (1975). For similar statutes in other states, see infa note 217.
26. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-11-105(a)(1) (1980) and UmiF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS
AcT, § 4(a), 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975) provide that a release given in good faith to one joint tortfeasor
"reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the
covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater . . . ." For
further discussion of this doctrine and its application in Mary Carter cases, see infra § II.B.
27. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-11-104() (1980) provides:
The judgment of a court in determining the liability of the several defendants to a
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As illustrated by the above example, there are various benefits of a Mary
Carter agreement for the agreeing parties. The plaintiff is guaranteed a minimum recovery regardless of the outcome of trial or settlement negotiations.
The plaintiff also may realize a recovery far in excess of the guaranteed amount
if there is a large enough verdict against the nonsettling defendant. In addition,
the likelihood of such a verdict is enhanced by the cooperation at trial between
the plaintiff and the settling defendant.
The benefit of the agreement to the settling defendant is that his liability
to the plaintiff is set at a maximum amount, which may be reduced to zero
if a sufficiently large verdict against the nonsettling defendant is recovered. In
a jurisdiction that does not provide for contribution among tortfeasors, the
settling defendant's total liability is established by the Mary Carter agreement.
Even in a jurisdiction that provides for contribution, the settling defendant may
be able to avoid liability above the amount guaranteed in the agreement. If,
through the agreeing parties' cooperation at trial, there is a verdict in favor
of the settling defendant, he then is not liable for contribution. Even if there
is a verdict against both defendants, the settling defendant is able to avoid
contribution if, as discussed below, 28 the court construes the Mary Carter agreement to be the type of settlement that bars contribution against the settling
defendant.
There are two distinct problems caused by Mary Carter agreements. The
most easily recognized problem is the presence at trial of a defendant who has
an identity of interest with the plaintiff. As in the example above, the opportunity for collusion between the plaintiff and a codefendant may lead not only
to a substantial verdict for the plaintiff, but also to exoneration for the settling
defendant. Thus, as the result of an unfair trial, the nonsettling defendant loses
both the case brought by the plaintiff and the possibility of contribution from
the settling tortfeasor.
The second problem is the effect a Mary Carter agreement has on the
apportionment of responsibility among joint tortfeasors. For instance, if the jury
in the example above had found Martha and Shade Tree jointly and severally
liable for George's injuries, Shade Tree would be entitled in most jurisdictions
to seek contribution from Martha. 29 Martha may then contend that she had
settled with George and, therefore, is not liable for contribution. Under the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Martha's success in resisting
contribution depends upon whether the court finds that the settlement between
George and Martha was in good faith. 30 Thus, Martha may be able to escape

claimant for an injury or wrongful death after trial on the merits, shall be binding among
such defendants in determining their right to contribution or indemnity, except where a
claimant commenced an action for injury or wrongful death prior to April 3, 1968.
Sce also UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRTF.AsoRs ACT, § 3(f), 12 U.L.A. 89 (1975).
28. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text and § 1.C.
29. See TENN. CODE. ANN. § 29-11-102(a) (1980); infra § 1.C.
30. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-11-105(a)(2) (1980); UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRTFEASoRS
ACT, § 4, 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975) (a release given in good faith "discharges the tort-feasor to whom
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contribution, either because she was exonerated at trial of liability to George
or because she has settled with George. If she is not liable for contribution,
and if there is no reduction in George's judgment against Shade Tree because
of the settlement with Martha, the result is that the entire burden of compensating the plaintiff falls upon one of two jointly liable tortfeasors.3 '
Judicial responses to Mary Carter agreements vary widely. Some courts have
taken steps to eliminate the use of Mary Carter agreements, either because of
their distortion of the adversary process or because of their effect on the allocation of liability among defendants. The steps taken include outright prohibition of these agreements, refusal to enforce the agreement between the parties,
and frustrating the agreement's purpose by either reducing the plaintiff's judgment on the basis of the agreement or refusing to permit the agreement to bar
32
the nonsettling defendant's right to contribution.
Other courts have rejected both the notion that Mary Carter agreements
are hopelessly irreconcilable with fair trials and that the liability shifting caused
by a Mary Carter agreement should be prevented. These courts permit the use
of Mary Carter agreements, but acknowledge that the agreements may adversely
affect the fairness of a trial against the nonsettling defendant. Even courts that
allow Mary Carter agreements, therefore, do not permit the agreement to be
kept secret and often allow the nonsettling defendant to inform the trier of fact
33
of the parties' true positions.
The purpose of this article is to suggest what should be done about Mary
Carter agreements. First, section II examines various reasons and methods
adopted by courts to eliminate Mary Carter agreements or to frustrate their
essential purpose. Turning then to juridictions that view Mary Carter agreements as essentially legitimate, section III discusses the steps taken by courts
to protect the nonsettling defendant's right to a fair trial. Section IV analyzes
the arguments favoring a permissive approach to Mary Carter agreements and
evaluates the means employed to eliminate trial prejudice to the nonsettling
defendant. This article concludes there are no adequate solutions to the problems
of trial unfairness and inequitable distribution of liability created by Mary Carter
agreements, and there are no good reasons for courts and legislatures to continue
accommodating use of these agreements.
II.

ELIMINATING

MARY

CARTER AGREEMENTS

In the frequently cited case of Lum v. Stinnett,34 the Nevada Supreme Court
took the most direct approach to eliminating Mary Carter agreements. The
Lum court declared Mary Carter agreements void. The court reversed a plain-

it is given from all liability for contribution to any other tort-feasor"). For further discussion, see
infra
5 II.C.
31. See infra55 II.B.-D.
32. See infra
S II.
33. See infra
55 III.A.-B.
34. 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971).
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tiff's verdict and ordered a new trial because of a Mary Carter agreement
between the plaintiff and two codefendants. 5 The court based its holding on
principles of public policy - champerty, ethics, and trial fairness - that will
36
be examined in detail below.
A less direct approach taken by some courts is to reduce the verdict against
the nonsettling defendant on the basis of the Mary Carter agreement. This
approach, as a practical matter, strongly discourages Mary Carter agreements
by treating them as unconditional settlements between the plaintiff and the
settling defendant. Courts taking this second approach to eliminating Mary
Carter agreements rely primarily upon principles of contribution among joint
tortfeasors. These courts perceive that the effect of a successful Mary Carter
agreement is to force the nonsettling defendant to indemnify fully the settling
defendant. Depending upon the jurisdiction's policies regarding contribution,
courts have held that such a result is contrary either to doctrines prohibiting
contribution among joint tortfeasors 37 or to doctrines providing for contribution,
but not indemnity, among joint tortfeasors. 3 8
A.

Banning the Use of Mary Carter Agreements: Champerty, Ethics and Trial
Fairness
1.

Champerty

In Lum, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that a Mary Carter agree3 9
ment constituted maintenance and champerty and violated the canons of ethics.
Lum was a medical malpractice action in which the Mary Carter agreement
was between the plaintiff and the insurance carriers of two defendants - the
emergency room physician and the plaintiff's family doctor. The nonsettling
defendant was another physician, who allegedly failed to read the plaintiffs xrays properly. 40 Only the nonsettling defendant was found liable at trial. 4 1 Noting
that "irregularities ' 42 in the conduct of the trial had "so warped presentation

35.

Id. at 412-13, 488 P.2d at 353.

36. See infra § II.A. The court in Lum also mentioned a real party in interest problem. 87
Nev. at 408, 488 P.2d at 350-51; see infra § III.D.
37. See infra notes 121-33 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 143-51, 167-77 and accompanying text.
39. 87 Nev. at 407-08, 411, 488 P.2d at 347, 352.
40. Id. at 404, 488 P.2d at 348.
41.
The parties entered into the Mary Carter agreement on the day jury selection began.
The nonagreeing defendant's counsel was told at that time that there was some agreement between
the parties. He did not see a copy of the agreement, however, or become aware of all its terms
until the agreeing defendants were dismissed upon their motion, without objection by the plaintiff,
at the close of the plaintiff's case. Counsel for the nonagreeing defendant then moved for a mistrial
and the court ordered that copies of the agreement be given to the court and counsel. The motion
for mistrial was denied. Id. at 406, 488 P.2d at 348-49.
42. Id. at 412, 488 P.2d at 353. The "irregularities" included: plaintiff's opening statement
focused on the nonagreeing defendant's fault and asserted the agreeing defendants' reliance on his
expertise; the agreeing defendants made no opening statements; plaintiff's counsel treated the agreeing defendants as adverse witnesses. Id. at 405, 488 P.2d at 348-49.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1986

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [1986], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XX.XVIII

of the case as to deny a fair trial," ' 43 the supreme court held the agreement
44
void and ordered a new trial.
The court in Lum defined maintenance as follows: " 'Maintenance exists
when a person without interest in a suit officiously intermeddles therein by
assisting either party with money or otherwise to prosecute or defend it.' ,,4"
Champerty was defined as " 'maintenance with the additional feature of an
agreement for the payment of compensation or personal profit from the subject
matter of the suit.' "46 With regard to maintenance, the Nevada court reasoned
that the insurance carriers for the agreeing defendants were strangers to the
action between the plaintiff and the nonagreeing defendant. The promise of
these strangers to pay the plaintiff, if he prosecuted his claim against the nonsettling defendants, constituted maintenance. The agreement constituted champerty because the insurance carriers would profit from any recovery against the
nonsettling defendant.4
Lum's finding of maintenance and champerty focused on only the agreeing
defendants' insurers as "strangers" to the litigation.48 The court made no mention of the agreeing defendants' lack of an interest in the plaintiff's claim. It
is uncertain, therefore, whether the Nevada court would have reached the same
conclusion if the defendants themselves, rather than their insurers, were the
4
contracting parties deemed to have acquired an interest in the plaintiffs claim. 1
Other courts have rejected the argument that a Mary Carter agreement is
champertous both when the agreement is between the plaintiff and an alleged
tortfeasor and when the tortfeasor's insurer is the agreeing party. In Lahocki v.

43. Id. at 412, 488 P.2d at 353. One author argued that a Mary Carter agreement constitutes
"an unconstitutional denial of due process of law, unequal treatment before the law, and a deprivation
of the 'right to a fair trial .....
' " Freedman, supra note 6, at 619-20 (emphasis in original); see
also Mark C. Bloome Co. v. Superior Court, _Cal.
App.
-, cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 189
(1986); City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. App. 3d 856, 222 Cal. Rptr. 562 (Ct.
App. 1986) (rejecting due process and equal protection challenges to California's statutory version
of Mary Carter agreements).
44. 87 Nev. at 412-13, 488 P.2d at 353.
45. Id. at 408, 488 P.2d at 350 (quoting 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Maintenance S 1(b) (1939)).
46. Id. (quoting 14 C.J.S, Champerty and Maintenance 9 2 (1939)).
47. Id. The authors of one article argued that a Mary Carter agreement is not champertous
because the settling defendant does not derive "compensation or personal profit" from the agreement. Eubanks & Cocchiarella, supra note 3, at 20. Using the Mary Carter agreement in Hegarty
v. Campbell Soup Co., 214 Neb. 716, 335 N.W.2d 758 (1983) as a prototype, the authors assert
that "Union Pacific [settling defendant] would derive no compensation or profit from the agreement,
but could only reduce the amount of its debt to Hegarty [plaintiff]." The authors do not explain
their distinction, which is contrary to the Hegarty court's conclusion that the Mary Carter agreement
"created an interest on the part of the Union Pacific in the amount of damages recovered by the
plaintiff in this litigation." 214 Neb. at 724-25, 335 N.W.2d at 764.
48. 214 Neb. at 724-25, 335 N.W.2d at 764.
49. See Monjay v. Evergreen School Dist. No. 114, 13 Wash. App. 654, 661, 537 P.2d 825,
830 (1975), in which the court found the conditional repayment clause in a Mary Carter agreement
between plaintiff and alleged tortfeasors (not their insurers) void and stated, "It is our opinion
that this agreement contains strong overtones of champerty which we cannot sanction."
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stated that the agreeing defendant was not
Contee Sand & Gravel Co.,10 the court
" 'without interest' in this case." 51 In Wright v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., s2
the court stated that the alleged tortfeasor's insurer "had53 a real interest in
settling the claims against its insureds by the [plaintiffs]."
The analysis used by these courts, however, in rejecting the argument that
a Mary Carter agreement constitutes maintenance and champerty, is superficial.
The question should not be whether the agreeing party, absent the Mary Carter
agreement, had some generalized "interest" in the lawsuit as a whole. Rather,
the question is whether the agreeing party had any legitimate beneficial interest
in the plaintiffs claim.5 4 At least one court has so delineated the issue. In Bass
v. Phoenix Seadrill!78, Ltd., 51 an admiralty action, the district court applying
federal common law found the Mary Carter agreement champertous because
"Phoenix [the agreeing defendant] did not . . . have an 'interest' in the lawsuit

Phoeas the term relates to champerty. Although not a stranger to the lawsuit,
'5 6
nix had no interest in the relief demanded by Bass [the plaintiff].

50. 41 Md. App. 579, 398 A.2d 490 (Ct. Spec. App. 1979), reo'd sub nom. General Motors
Corp. v. Lahocki, 286 Md. 714, 410 A.2d 1039 (1980).
51. Id. at 608, 398 A.2d at 507 (referring to-"without interest" as an element of the doctrines
of maintenance and champerty). The court of special appeals in Lahocki found no prejudicial error
in the trial court's refusal to admit evidence of the Mary Carter agreement. The Maryland Court
of Appeals reversed, but not on grounds of champerty or maintenance. General Motors Corp. v.
Lahocki, 286 Md. 714, 727, 410 A.2d 1039, 1045-46 (1980) ("We do not believe the agreement
here amounts to champerty, one of the factors that led the court in Lum v. Stinnett to declare the
agreement void.").
52. 63 N.C. App. 465, 305 S.E.2d 190 (1983).
53. Id. at 469, 305 S.E.2d at 193; see also Cullen v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 211 Kan.
368, 374, 507 P.2d 353, 360 (1973), in which the court stated that State Farm (insurer of alleged
tortfeasor) had "at least a possible interest in any wrongful death action brought by the guardian
[plaintiff]."
In most of the Mary Carter cases discussed herein in which the issue of champerty has arisen,
it has been raised by the nonagreeing defendant in the proceedings on the tort victim's original
claim. In Wright, the issue arose in a subsequent suit brought by the nonagreeing defendant and
his insurer seeking damages on grounds of champerty and maintenance from Commercial, the
insurer of the agreeing defendant. Commercial had been the contracting party in the Mary Carter
agreement with the original tort plaintiffs. The court affirmed summary judgment for Commercial.
63 N.C. App. at 465-68, 305 S.E.2d at 190-92.
54. See McKay, supra note 6, at 254 n.88 ("In the plaintiff-codefendant context, the device
[loan receipt] is champertous not only because of a division of proceeds between plaintiff and a
stranger to the plaintiff's interest but also because the device limits the non-agreeing defendant's right
to compromise with the plaintiff.") (emphasis added).
55. 562 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Tex.), aff'd, 573 F. Supp. 866 (1983), rev'd in part, 749 F.2d
1154 (1985).
56. Id. at 798; accord Note, supra note 1, at 880 (1977) ("[Tlhe interest of the defendant
entering the agreement is solely in the outcome of the litigation, and not in the cause of action
A Gallagher covenant would thus seem to constitute champerty [under Arizona law].").
itself ....
In Bass, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's finding on champerty. 749 F.2d 1154, 1158
n.7 (5th Cir. 1985). The Fifth Circuit declined to ban Mary Carter settlements on any grounds.
The court stated, "Despite the potential for abuse, we think that properly disclosed Mary Carter
agreements serve a legitimate function of providing litigants with capital with which to continue
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The effect of the doctrines of champerty and maintenance on Mary Carter
agreements depends upon the extent to which these common law doctrines are
still viable and, if so, the remedies available to a party who claims to be injured
by such an agreement. The court in Lum, having determined that the Mary
Carter agreement was champertous and therefore void, ordered a new trial in
which "the action shall stand reinstated against Greene and Romeo [settling
defendants], as well as appellant.'' 57 Even if champertous agreements are illegal,
however, it does not necessarily follow that a verdict in a case involving a
Mary Carter agreement will be overturned on this basis.
First, some jurisdictions have held it is not maintenance or champerty to
advance money to finance an action by a poor person.-" Of course, not all
plaintiffs who enter into Mary Carter agreements are poor. Nevertheless, Mary
Carter agreements have been defended because they provide the plaintiff with
funds necessary to permit the plaintiff to pursue his claims. 9 Second, there is
authority for the propositions that only a party to a champertous contract may
raise the defense of champerty and that a plaintiffs champertous agreement is
60
not a ground for dismissal of the plaintiffs claim.
This latter doctrine was applied by the Tennessee Supreme Court in a case
involving a Mary Carter agreement. In Record v. Insurance Company of North
America,61 the plaintiff originally sued two insurance companies alleging that one
or both of the companies had issued to the plaintiff an insurance contract that
was in effect at the time of his loss. Both companies had denied coverage.6 2
prosecution of their claims. Abuse of the device, we think, is more properly dealt with on a caseby-case basis." Id. at 1159.
57. 87 Nev. at 412-13, 488 P.2d at 353.
58. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 541 (1932); 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 1423 (1962); McKay, supra note 6, at 254 n.88.
59. See supra note 56; see also Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1205,
, 228 Cal. Rptr. 250, 256 (plaintiffs benefit from ability to maintain themselves while matter
is being resolved) (Ct. App.), review granted, 709 P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1985); Webb v.
Dessert Seed Co., 718 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Colo. 1986) (Mary Carter agreement recited that plaintiffs
agreed to its terms because they needed money to operate their farms and to pursue their claims);
Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Otis, 145 Ind. App. 159, 178-79, 250 N.E.2d 378, 392 (1969)
(one policy reason supporting loan receipt agreements is economic need of injured plaintiff); Pacific
Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 557 (Minn. 1977) (loan receipt agreements
allow plaintiff to receive some compensation without waiting until lengthy trial concludes); Grillo
v. Burke's Paint Co., 275 Or. 421, 427, 551 P.2d 449, 452 (1976) (Mary Carter agreements
provide fast economic relief to injured plaintiff); Mullins & Morrison, Who Is Maiy Carter and Wthy
Is She Saying All Those Nasty Things About Pre-Trial Settlements?, 23 FOR THE DEF., Dec. 1981, at 14,
17 (plaintiff gains the resources to finance "full scale discovery and trial preparations"); Unsettling
Contributions, supra note 1, at 152 (Mary Carter agreements "compensate quickly those who can
least accommodate both personal and litigation expenses because of personal injury incapacitation");
Case Note, Mary Carter in Arkansas: Settlements, Secret Agreements, and Some Serious Problems, 36 ARK.
L. REv. 570, 584-85 (1983) ("needy and legitimate plaintiff may be aided in seeking recovery by
the advancement of funds under a secret agreement").
60. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 544 (1932); McKay, supra note 6, at 254 n.88.
61. 222 Tenn. 548, 438 S.W.2d 743 (1969).
62. Id. at 550-51, 438 S.W.2d at 744-45. Plaintiff was in the trucking business and the loss
resulted from the burning of a load of cotton being hauled by the plaintiff. Id. at 550, 438 S.W.2d
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The plaintiff and one insurer, Selective, entered into a Mary Carter agreement6 3
pursuant to which the plaintiff dismissed the first suit and refiled solely against
the other insurer, INA. 64 INA alleged that the agreement between the plaintiff
and Selective was champertous. The chancellor dismissed the plaintiffs bill on
grounds of champerty.6 s
The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the chancellor's dismissal.6" First,
accepting the plaintiffs characterization of the agreement as a loan receipt, the
court discussed two cases in which courts had approved subrogation-type loan
receipt agreements.5 7 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the issue of the
validity of a loan receipt agreement was not determinative and would not be
decided.'
The court then turned directly to champerty, which it defined as " '[a]
bargain by a stranger with a party to a suit, by which such third person
undertakes to carry on the litigation at his own cost and risk, in consideration
of receiving, if successful, a part of the proceeds or subject matter sought to
be recovered.' ",69 The court did not decide whether the agreement at bar was
champertous. Rather, after reviewing Tennessee cases on the champerty doctrine, the court noted, " 'It is the rule in this state that a suit will not be
dismissed for champerty because complainants and an attorney or layman entered into a champertous contract relating to its prosecution.' -70 The court,
therefore, concluded that the chancellor erred in dismissing the plaintiff's bill
7
on grounds of champerty. 1
The holding in Record is in clear opposition to the Lum court's refusal, on
grounds of champerty, to permit a trial to proceed when a plaintiff had entered

at 744. One insurer, Selective, argued that it had cancelled the policy prior to the loss. The other
insurer, INA, contended that Selective's notice of cancellation was ineffective and that INA, therefore, was not liable under the policy it had subsequently issued. Id. at 550-51, 438 S.W.2d at

745.
63. The agreement provided that Selective would lend plaintiff the amount of the loss if he
would dismiss the first.suit against it, release all claims under its policy and sue INA for the loss.
Selective would pay all costs of the suit and provide attorneys. Plaintiff would repay the loan only
to the extent of any recovery from INA. Id. at 550-51, 438 S.W.2d at 745.
64. Id. at 551, 438 S.W.2d at 745.
65.
66.

Id. at 552, 438 S.W.2d at 745.
Id. at 557-58, 438 S.W.2d at 748.

67. In arguing that the agreement was valid as a loan receipt, the plaintiff relied upon an
A.L.R. annotation dealing with the subrogation loan receipt agreement. 222 Tenn. at 553, 438
S.W.2d at 745. The subrogation loan receipt cases discussed by the court were Lancaster Mills v.
Merchants' Cotton Press Co., 89 Tenn. 1, 14 S.W. 317 (1890) and the frequently-cited opinion
of Justice Brandeis in Luckenbach v. W.J. McCahan Sugar Ref. Co., 248 U.S. 139 (1918). 222
Tenn. at 553-54, 438 S.W.2d at 746.
68. 222 Tenn. at 555, 438 S.W.2d at 746.
69. Id. at 555, 438 S.W.2d at 746-47 (quoting BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968)).
70. Id. at 557, 438 S.W.2d at 747 (quoting Walsh v. Rose, 29 Tenn. App. 78, 88, 193
S.W.2d 118, 122 (1945)).
71.

Id., 438 S.W.2d at 747. The court also rejected INA's argument that the plaintiff and

Selective should be denied relief because they came into court with unclean hands. Id., 438 S.W.2d
at 747.
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into a Mary Carter agreement. 72 The court in Record, however, stated that
champertous agreements are "illegal between the parties," ' 73 which implies that
the doctrine of champerty may still affect Mary Carter agreements in Tennessee. 74 That the court declined to decide if the agreement was champertous
is not particularly significant in light of its failure to appreciate that the agreement was not a typical subrogation-type loan receipt between an insured and
his insurer in the context of a suit by the insured against a third party.15
In addition, Record was decided at the pleading stage of the litigation. The
Record court stated, "It is our opinion defendant has not been prejudiced in
any manner by the action of those parties in entering into the agreement or
their actions pursuant to the agreement.'' 76 Since much of the prejudice caused
by Mary Carter agreements occurs during trial, the Record court did not have
before it, as the Lum court did, a case in which the champertous agreement
77
tainted the fairness of the trial.
In light of the original purpose of the champerty doctrine to discourage
unnecessary and oppressive litigation, 78 Mary Carter agreements are champertous. The agreeing defendant acquires an interest in the plaintiff's claim, through
the agreement, which in turn creates a barrier to settlement with the nonagreeing defendant.7 9 The doctrines of champerty and maintenance, however,

72. See supra text accompanying notes 39-49.
73. 222 Tenn. at 556, 438 S.W.2d at 747. For this proposition, the court quoted Staub v.
Sewanee Coal, Coke & Land Co., 140 Tenn. 505, 509, 205 S.W. 320, 322 (1917). In a 1983
article on the subject of champerty, however, Dean Cox reviewed the history of Tennessee common
law and various statutory enactments and repeals dealing with champerty and maintenance. While
the article primarily concerns champerty as a prohibition on the buying of pretensed titles to real
property, Dean Cox concluded that it is unclear whether Tennessee has abandoned the prohibition
of champerty and maintenance with regard to sharing the proceeds of lawsuits. Cox, Champerty As
We Know It, 13 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 139, 198, 201 (1983).
74. If the agreement is "illegal," a court may refuse to enforce it between the parties, which
will discourage parties from entering into such an agreement because the success of the arrangement
will depend upon the parties' willingness to abide by its terms. In addition, the attorneys who
participate in a Mary Carter agreement may be subject to discipline for their involvement in an
illegal arrangement. See infra text accompanying note 86.
75. Selective, the agreeing defendant, had denied coverage and was originally a defendant
to the plaintiff's claim. 222 Tenn. at 550-51, 438 S.W.2d at 744-45. By entering into the agreement,
Selective was not seeking to assure its subrogation rights against a third-party tortfeasor or obligor.
Rather, Selective was attempting to avoid coverage altogether by guaranteeing that the plaintiff
would seek full recovery from the nonagreeing defendant. For further discussion of the distinction
between subrogation loan receipts and Mary Carter loan receipts, see supra note 6.
76. 222 Tenn. at 557, 438 S.W.2d at 747. But see supra note 14 (prejudice to the nonsettling
defendant in attempting to negotiate settlement with the plaintiff).
77. See infra text accompanying notes 95-96.
78. The background of champerty includes a medieval and Christian condemnation of litigiousness and a prohibition against a feudal practice by which powerful persons enhanced their
estates through purchasing and prosecuting doubtful claims to land in exchange for a share of the
proceeds. 6A A. CoRtIN, supra note 58, § 1422; Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REv.
48, 68 (1935).
79. See supra note 14 and infra notes 304-11 and accompanying text.
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have been eroded in recent years.80 Thus, although the Lum court and other
courts have found Mary Carter agreements prohibited by champerty, 8' it is
unlikely champerty will provide a solution to the problems of Mary Carter
agreements in many jurisdictions. In any case, it is more satisfactory for courts
to address directly the problems of unfairness to nonsettling defendants that are
created by Mary Carter agreements, than to respond to these agreements solely
within the limited confines of the champerty doctrine.
2.

Ethics

Ethical considerations, relied upon by the Lum court,8 2 provide a second set
of reasons for eliminating Mary Carter agreements. In addressing those considerations, it is necessary to distinguish between Mary Carter agreements that
are kept secret and those that are not.
All courts that have ruled upon the use of Mary Carter agreements have
held that such an agreement must be disclosed by the agreeing parties either without request or, in some cases, in response to an inquiry by another party to the
action."' These courts have recognized a trial that proceeds with a Mary Carter
agreement in effect may be unfair to the nonsettling defendant and present to
the court, jury and public a spurious impression of the real interests of the
parties. Only by requiring disclosure can courts act to eliminate these prob84
lems.
In jurisdictions where courts have ruled in favor of automatic disclosure, it
would be an indisputable breach of legal ethics for an attorney to keep a Mary
Carter agreement secret.8" In jurisdictions where there are no judicial decisions

80.

Corbin asserts that in many states, the doctrines of champerty and maintenance were

never well established, and in others, the law "has very largely lapsed, except as it may in part
be embodied in new statutes." 6A A. CORBIN, supra note 58, §§ 1422, 1424. Champerty and
maintenance were treated in the

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS

§§ 540-546 (1932), but are

not included in the second Restatement because "legislation has replaced the common law of
maintenance and champerty in many states."

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,

Introductory

Note to Ch. 8 (1981); see also supra note 73. The attorney's contingent fee contract has been a
primary concern of champerty as it has developed and been regulated in this country. 6A A.
CORBIN, supra note 58, §§ 1424-1426; Cox, supra note 73, at 197 n.88. The decline of the doctrine,
therefore, may be due at least in part to the general acceptance of the contingent fee arrangement,
as well as the rise of public interest litigation. See generally Cox, supra note 73; Radin, supra note
78, at 69-78 (defending attorney contingent fee contracts); Case Comment, Constitutional Law Tennessee Barratg,Statute Conflicts with the First Amendment, 11 MEM. ST. U.L. REy. 424 (1981).

81. See supra notes 39-57 and accompanying text.
82. 87 Nev. at 408, 488 P.2d at 351-52. The court cited a 1970 opinion of the Arizona
State Bar Committee on Rules of Professional Conduct, Op. No. 70-18, for the proposition that

defense counsel with an actual interest in furthering plaintiff's cause may not participate in litigation.
Id. at 410, 488 P.2d at 351-52. The opinion prohibited a secret nonconditional settlement in which
the settling defendants would participate actively in the trial. The Arizona Supreme Court, however,

has approved non-secret Mary Carter agreements (known as Gallagher covenants) if no actual
collusion or perjury occurs that prejudices the nonagreeing defendant. See City of Tucson v. Gallagher, 108 Ariz. 140, 493 P.2d 1197 (1972); Note, supra note 1.
83. See infra § III.B.
84. See infra §III.
85.

Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1981) pro-
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requiring automatic disclosure, it is probably still a violation of legal ethics for
an attorney to participate in a secret Mary Carter agreement. Ethical Consideration 8-5 provides in part: "Fraudulent, deceptive, or otherwise illegal conduct
by a participant in a proceeding before a tribunal or legislative body is inconsistent with fair administration of justice, and it should never be participated
in or condoned by lawyers. ' "'' A trial in which a plaintiff and a defendant
have secretly settled their dispute is fraudulent and deceptive. It permits the
settling parties to subvert the rules on distribution of peremptory challenges
and examination of friendly and adverse witnesses. 7 It deliberately misleads the
fact finder in evaluating the credibility of witnesses and the candor of the
attorneys' arguments." Secret Mary Carter agreements simply should not be
tolerated.8 9 Until a jttrisdiction specifically requires disclosure, codefendants may
be able to protect themselves by using discovery to request information about
settlements between the plaintiff and other parties and then relying upon the
duties of counsel in responding to discovery to insure disclosure. 90
Even when Mary Carter agreements are disclosed, ethical problems remain.'
The Mary Carter agreement is unique among settlement devices because it not

vides: "In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: . . . (3) Conceal or knowingly fail
to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal." Disciplinary Rule 7-106(A) provides: "A
lawyer shall not disregard or advise his client to disregard a standing rule of a tribunal . . . ,
but he may take appropriate steps in good faith to test the validity of such rule or ruling." Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.4 (1983) provides: "A lawyer shall not: . . . (c) knowingly
disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion
that no valid obligation exists."
86. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-5 (1981). Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 3.3 (1983) provides: "(a) lawyer shall not knowlingly: .. .(2) fail to disclose a material
fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by
the client." See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(c) (1983) (lawyer shall not
engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation).

87.
88.

See supra notes 17-21.
See supra note 22.

89.

See Daniel v. Penrod Drilling Co., 393 F. Supp. 1056, 1061 (D. La. 1975) ("But even

if the lawyer has no duty to disclose the whole truth, he does have a duty not to deceive the trier
of fact, an obligation not to hide the real facts behind a facade."); Trampe v. Wisconsin Tel.
Co., 214 Wis. 210, 215, 252 N.W. 675, 676-77 (1934) (plaintiff's claim dismissed because secret
settlement with one defendant created "fundamental defect in the pleadings").
90. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e) & (g); TENN. R. Civ. P. 26.05 & .07.
91. Two other ethical objections to Mary Carter agreements, see Note, supra note 1,at 88187, certainly apply to their secrecy, but do not present problems as serious if the agreement is
disclosed. First, Canon 7 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides that attorneys
have a duty to the adversary system of justice to provide "competent, adverse presentation of
evidence and issues." EC 7-20. The attorneys for the plaintiff and the agreeing defendant in a
Mary Carter situation certainly will not provide adverse presentations. Nevertheless, both of these
attorneys will be making presentations adverse to the nonagreeing defendant. So long as the true
positions of the parties are fully disclosed to judge and jury, the trial will remain an adversary
proceeding, albeit with one more party on plaintiff's side and one less on the nonagreeing defendant's. Second, Canon 9 is entitled, "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional
Impropriety" and provides: "A lawyer should promote public confidence in our system and in the
legal profession." EC 9-1. The practice of using secret Mary Carter agreements and conducting
trials with sham defendants will certainly reinforce notions of attorneys as deceptive and conniving
manipulators and of the legal system as a minefield of injustice for the unwary.
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only removes the settling defendant's desire to defeat the plaintiffs claim, but
also creates a motive for the settling defendant to assist the plaintiff in obtaining
the largest possible recovery against the nonsettling defendant. By creating this
motivation, the agreement may encourage perjury. Ethical Consideration 7-28
provides, "Witnesses should always testify truthfully and should be free from
any financial inducements that might tempt them to do otherwise. A lawyer
should not pay or agree to pay a non-expert witness an amount in excess of
92
reimbursement for expenses and financial loss incident to his being a witness.' '
Of course, any person who has a stake in the outcome of litigation has an
incentive to be untruthful as to those facts unfavorable to his position. That
is unavoidable without resorting to the generally discredited practice of disqualifying witnesses for interest.93 In a case in which the settling tortfeasor is
also a witness, however, the Mary Carter agreement often provides a financial
inducement for the witness to testify differently than he would if his motivations
were not rearranged by the agreement. 94 Although the ability of the nonsettling
defendant to impeach the tortfeasor-witness may ameliorate the resulting harm,
it is nevertheless ethically questionable for attorneys to play a role in creating
such an inducement to perjury.
3.

Trial Fairness

The court in Lum pointed out in some detail the ways in which the Mary
Carter agreement had affected the fairness of the trial. In the opening statement,
plaintiffs counsel displayed feigned candor regarding the lack of culpability of
the settling defendants. Plaintiff's counsel called the settling defendants as adverse parties, examining one with leading questions, and successfully opposed
full cross-examination by the nonsettling defendant's counsel. Plaintiffs counsel
did not oppose the granting of motions to dismiss the settling defendants at
the close of plaintiffs case. 9 The court concluded that through these "irregularities proceeding from the agreement, the trial was deprived of its proper
adversary character.' ' 9
The Lum court also suggested that a fair trial would not have occurred even
if the jury had been made aware of the agreement. The court noted that the
agreement, written by plaintiffs counsel, contained several self-serving recitals

Note, supra note 1, at 888, also discusses conflict of interest problems that arise when an
attorney represents a defendant and his liability insurer and the Mary Carter agreement is between
the liability insurer and the plaintiff. In such a case, the insurer's interest may be in a large
plaintiff's verdict while the insured defendant may be interested in being exonerated for any amounts
above his insurance coverage.
92. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL R.SpONSIBiLrry EC 7-28 (1981). Model Rules of Professional

Conduct Rule 3.4 (1983) provides: "A lawyer shall not . . . (b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law."
93. See MCCoRENCK, EvIDENCE § 65 (3d ed. 1984).
94. See McKay, supra note 6, at 246-51,
95. 87 Nev. at 405-06, 488 P.2d at 348-49.
96. Id. at 412, 488 P.2d at 353; cf. In re MGM Grand Hotel Fire Litigation, 570 F. Supp.
913, 932 (D. Nev. 1983) (distinguishing Lum because the settling defendant would not appear at

trial and several other Mary Carter elements were absent).
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about the plaintiffs damages, the nonsettling defendant's liability, his insurance
and his insurance carrier's "irresponsible position." 97 Thus, presentation of the
entire agreement to the jury would have exposed the jury to otherwise incompetent and inadmissible declarations that would have been highly prejudicial
and unfair to the nonsettling defendant. The court also stated that it did not
know how the jury might react if informed of only the bare terms of the
agreement. 98 The court then concluded, "we only know that appellant had the
right to litigate his case without hazarding the prospect that such considerations
might affect the jury's verdict." ' 99
Trial fairness may be the strongest rationale in Lur for eliminating Mary
Carter agreements because this rationale does not depend upon the somewhat
obscure doctrine of champerty and because ethical doctrines do not clearly
prohibit non-secret Mary Carter agreements. Nevertheless, the Lum direct approach has not been widely followed.' 00 As discussed in section III, most courts,
apparently believing there is some reason to permit Mary Carter agreements,
have adopted various requirements for a trial involving a Mary Carter agreement in an attempt to reconcile these agreements with a fair trial for the
nonsettling defendant. The inadequacy of these requirements in assuring a fair
trial, and consequently the wisdom of the Lur court's conclusion, are addressed
further in sections III and IV below.
B.

Applying Credit Rules to Mary Carter Agreements to Prevent Contribution and
Indemnity for a Settling Tortfeasor

Mary Carter agreements interfere with judicial and legislative policies prohibiting or providing for contribution and indemnity among joint tortfeasors.' 0'
As illustrated by the hypothetical case in the introduction to this article, a Mary
Carter agreement is an agreement through which the plaintiff and one defendant
defendant alone the duty of compensating
hope to place upon the nonsettling
0 2
the plaintiff for his injuries.'
The common law approach to the distribution of liability among joint tort-

97. 87 Nev. at 411, 488 P.2d at 352.
98. Id. at 412, 488 P.2d at 352-53.
99. Id. at 412, 488 P.2d at 353. In response to the argument of plaintiff's counsel that
everything they did was "open and aboveboard," the court responded, "It is no answer to say
appellant was not stabbed in the back. If his hands were tied, it matters little that he could see
the blow coming." Id. at 411, 488 P.2d at 352. The court also added, "Thus, we think, the sum
of [plaintiff's] counsel's argument is that nimbler opposing counsel and an alert trial judge might
have defeated his plan." Id., 488 P.2d at 352.

100. Both jurists and law review writers have agreed, however, for varying reasons, that the
result in Lum should be followed. Florow v. Louisville & N.R.R. (In re Waverly Accident of Feb.
22-24, 1978), 502 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn. 1979) (discussed infra notes 167-77); see Ward v. Ochoa,
284 So. 2d 385, 388 (Fla. 1973) (Ervin, J., concurring); Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, No. C4838, slip op. at 3 (Tex. Nov. 26, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Tex file) (Spears, J., concurring)
(discussed infra notes 318-22); Freedman, supra note 6; McKay, supra note 6, at 257; Unfair and
Unnecessary, supra note 3, at 801.
101. 3 F. HARPER, F. JAmEs & 0. GRAY, supra note 9, § 10.2, at 57.
102. See supra 9 I.
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feasors did not require joinder of all potential defendants 0 3 and did not permit
contribution' 0 4 or indemnity'0 5 among joint tortfeasors. The plaintiff was presumed to know how best to assert his rights0 6 and the courts refused to grant
07
relief, in the form of contribution or indemnity, in favor of a wrongdoer.1 If
the plaintiff settled with one tortfeasor in partial satisfaction of his claim, however, a credit was allowed to diminish the amount of the claim recoverable
against other tortfeasors in order to prevent the plaintiff from receiving a double
recovery. 103
A Mary Carter agreement undermines this common law approach. First,
the settling tortfeasor obtains the prohibited contribution or indemnity from the
nonsettling tortfeasor when the result of the Mary Carter agreement is a judgment of sufficient amount for the plaintiff against the nonsettling tortfeasor.
Indemnity is accomplished when the amount of the judgment exceeds the guarantee in the agreement so that the settling tortfeasor ultimately pays nothing
to the plaintiff, while the nonsettling tortfeasor must satisfy the entire judgment.
Contribution, rather than full indemnity, is achieved when the judgment against
the nonsettling defendant is not large enough to permit the settling tortfeasor
to avoid all payment to the plaintiff, but is large enough to partially satisfy
the settling tortfeasor's obligation to the plaintiff under the agreement. 0 9
Second, a Mary Carter agreement induces the plaintiff to select his defendant
because of the agreement, rather than because of his assessment bf the relative
culpability of the tortfeasors." 0 Also, because the plaintiff does not receive a
double recovery if the settling tortfeasor ends up paying nothing to the plaintiff,
the settlement does not provide a credit reducing the plaintiffs judgment against
the nonsettling tortfeasor."' Thus, the nonsettling tortfeasor becomes the sole
target of the plaintiffs litigation efforts with no corresponding benefit of a setoff
against the plaintiffs judgment.
In jurisdictions that permit contribution among joint tortfeasors," 12 the goal
103.
104.
105.
another.

W. PRossER & W. KEETON, supra note 9, § 47, at 327.

Id. § 50, at 337.
Under very limited circumstances, one joint tortfeasor may be entitled to indemnity from
See 3 F. HARPER, F. JAms & 0. GRAY, supra note 9, § 10.2, at 57-63; W. PROSSER &
W. KEETON, supra note 9, § 51; V. SCHwARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 16.9 (1974 & Supp.
1981); Note, Tennessee Survey of the Law - Indemnity in Tort, 7 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 307 (1977).

106. Reese v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 55 Ill.2d 356, 367, 303 N.E.2d 382, 388 (1973) (Schaefer, J., dissenting).
107. W. PROSSER & W.

KEETON,

supra

note 9, §

50.

108. Id. § 49, at 335-36.
109. For example, in the hypothetical case in the introduction to this article, assume a judgment
against both defendants, or against the nonsettling defendant alone, for $25,000. Under the terms
of the Mary Carter agreement, the plaintiff will collect $25,000 from the nonsettling defendant and
$25,000 from the settling defendant.
110. In Reese v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 55 Ill.
2d 356, 367, 303 N.E.2d 382, 388 (1973),
Justice Schaefer, dissenting, argued that while many factors may legitimately influence the plaintiff's
free choice of defendants, "the law should not permit that choice to be influenced by a payment
received from one defendant which is designed to operate as an inducement to the plaintiff to join
in a pursuit of the other defendants, to the advantage of both of the pursuing parties."
111. See infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 121-32.
112. Today, "[n]early every jurisdiction, with the notable exception of South Carolina, has
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of the law is to promote equitable sharing of liability among the tortfeasors." 3
Contribution, not indemnity, is provided for joint tortfeasors who satisfy more
than their equitable share of the plaintiff's claim.114 In these jurisdictions, a
tortfeasor who settles with the plaintiff without obtaining the plaintiffs release
of the other tortfeasors is not permitted to seek contribution from the other
tortfeasors" 5 and, as in the common law approach, the plaintiffs claim against
the other tortfeasors is reduced on the basis of the partial settlement of the
claim." 6 In this way, the settling tortfeasor pays his equitable share to the
plaintiff in settlement and the nonsettling defendant is not liable for that share." 7
provided some method for shifting the burden for joint and several liability." Negotiation and Settlement;
Partial Settlement, 51 Civil Trial Manual (BNA) 801, 804 (1985); UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT,
Prefatory Note, 12 U.L.A. 38 (Supp. 1986) ("[A] substantial majority of the states now have
contribution in some form and the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A, now provides for it.")
But see infra § II.D. See generally F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 9, § 10.2, at 4054.
113. The Commissioner's Prefatory Note to the 1955 Revision of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act states, "This act would distribute the burden of responsibility equitably
among those who are jointly liable and thus avoid the injustice often resulting under the common
law." UNIv. CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRTFEAsoRs ACT (1985) Commissioner's prefatory note, 12
U.L.A. 59 (1975).
114. UNIF. 1ONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRTFEASORs ACT (1939) § 2(2), 12 U.L.A. 57 (1975); UNIF.
CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEAsoRs ACT (1955) § l(b), 12 U.L.A. 63 (1975); UNIF. COMPARATIVE
FAULT ACT, § 4(a), 12 U.L.A. 44 (Supp. 1986). The original Uniform Contribution Among Tort-

feasors Act, adopted in 1939, appears in the latest (1975) edition of Uniform Laws Annotated in
the Historical Note to the 1955 Revised Act. For clarity, citations to the 1939 and 1955 Acts will
indicate the year after the title.
115. Section l(d) of the 1955 Act provides:
A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to recover
contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or wrongful death is not
extinguished by the settlement nor in respect to any amount paid in a settlement which
is in excess of what was reasonable.
UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFBAsoRs ACT (1955), 12 U.L.A. 63 (1955); see also UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFvAsoRs ACT (1939) 5 2(3), 12 U.L.A. 57 (Goint tortfeasor who settles is
not entitled to contribution from non-settling joint tortfeasor); UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT §
4(b), 12 U.L.A. 44 (Supp. 1986) (settling party entitled to contribution if liability was extinguished
and only to extent settlement amount was reasonable).
116. Various credit schemes have been devised. The most common rules provide for either a
pro rata credit for the shares of the settling tortfeasors or a pro tanto credit for the amount paid
in settlement. These credit rules were judicially created at common law, see supra note 108 and
accompanying text, and have been incorporated into statutory systems allowing for contribution
among tortfeasors. See UNIv. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TowrvRASORs ACT (1939) § 5, 12 U.L.A. 58
(1975) (pro rata); UNIv. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTrRASORs ACT (1955) § 4, 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975)
(pro tanto). Under the UNI. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, § 6, 12 U.L.A. 45-46, (Supp. 1986), the

plaintiffs claim is reduced by the percentage of the settling defendant's causal fault. See Diggs v.
Hood, 772 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1985) (construing Unif. Comparative Fault Act as partially adopted
in Louisiana); see also V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 105, S 16.5 (discussion of comparative negligence
of tortfeasors not joined as defendants); infra note 161 (discussion of § 6 of UNIF. COMPARATIVE
FAULT ACT). But see Mayhew v. Berrian County Rd. Comm'n, 414 Mich. 399, 326 N.W.2d 366
(1982) (pro tanto reduction under Michigan's comparative fault system). For an excellent discussion
of these rules and other variations, see Harris, Washington's Unique Approach to PartialTort Settlements:
The Modified Pro Tanto Credit and the Reasonableness Hearing Requirement, 20 GONZACA L. REV. 69, 77105 (1985).
117. The Commissioner's Comment to § 1(d) states:
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A successful Mary Carter agreement subverts the equitable sharing contemplated by systems of contribution among joint tortfeasors. In a Mary Carter
agreement, the settling tortfeasor makes only a contingent payment to the plaintiff and, in effect, obtains contribution toward that payment from the nonsettling
tortfeasor if the plaintiff obtains a sufficiently large judgment against the nonsettling tortfeasor. The settling tortfeasor thus may avoid paying his equitable
share, or any share at all, through the interest he acquires in the plaintiff's
claim. If the plaintiff's judgment against the nonsettling tortfeasor is not reduced
on account of the settlement, and if, for reasons discussed in section II.C., the
settling tortfeasor is able to avoid contribution to the nonsettling tortfeasor, the
effect is that the nonsettling tortfeasor bears the entire burden of satisfying the
plaintiff's claim.
The effect of a Mary Carter agreement in facilitating otherwise prohibited
contribution or indemnity has led some courts to balk at giving these agreements
their intended effect."" One way to eliminate this effect of a Mary Carter
agreement is to follow Lum - void the agreement altogether and order that
the proceedings begin anew." 9 Another approach reasons that because the Mary
Carter agreement contains a release of the settling defendant, it is a settlement
for the guaranteed amount. The settlement then triggers a reduction of any
verdict the plaintiff recovers against other tortfeasors which, in effect, is a credit
for the nonsettling tortfeasors. 2 ° The credit eliminates that part of the nonsetling defendant's liability that by design in a Mary Carter agreement ultimately
benefits the settling defendant.
2
This approach is illustrated by Cullen v.Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway.' 1
The Cullen court ruled that the nonsettling defendant would be entitled to a
$29,600 credit toward any judgment the plaintiff obtained against the nonsettling
defendant. The credit represented an amount the plaintiff received from the
settling defendant pursuant to a Mary Carter loan receipt. 22 The court reasoned
that the substance of the loan receipt agreement was an attempt by one tortfeasor
to obtain indemnity, or at least contribution, from another tortfeasor. Under
Kansas law, neither contribution nor indemnity was allowed in the circumstances
of the case. 123 The court concluded, therefore, that the agreement must be "held

The policy of the Act is to encourage rather than discourage settlements. The tortfeasor
who settles removes himself entirely from the case so far as contribution is concerned if
he is able and chooses to buy his peace for less than the entire liability. If he discharges
the entire obligation it is only fair to give him contribution from those whose liability he
has discharged. Since the settlement must be reasonable it follows that the question of
total liability to the injured party may be litigated in the contribution action.
UNI. CONTRIBUTION AMtONo TORTFF.ASORS ACT § 1(d) comment, 12 U.L.A. 65 (1975). See generally
3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 9, § 10.2, at 54-57.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See infra text accompanying notes 121-25 & 143-51.
87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347; see supra notes 39-57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 108 & 116 and accompanying text.
211 Kan. 368, 507 P.2d 353 (1973).
Id. at 377-78, 507 P.2d at 361-62.
Id. at 375, 507 P.2d at 361.
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ineffective" to confer these benefits on the settling defendant. 2 4 The court's
solution to the problem, however, was to give the agreement effect, not as it
was written, but as if it were a conventional, unconditional partial settlement
in which the plaintiff received the money with no obligation to repay and the
amount received operated as a credit to the subsequent judgment agqinst the
nonsettling defendant.

125

In Cullen and other cases holding that the nonsettling defendant is entitled
to a credit on account of the Mary Carter agreement, 126 the Mary Carter
agreement was in the form of a loan receipt. The guaranteed amount was
actually advanced to the plaintiff prior to the resolution of the litigation. 2 7 The
Cullen court treated the fact that the money had been received by the plaintiff
as significant in its resolution of the problem. It stated, "The policy of our
law where efforts have been made to thwart the rules respecting either contribution or indemnity has been to leave the parties where it finds them."' 2
Because the plaintiff already had the money and the repayment clause was
unenforceable, the court could conclude that the plaintiff would retain the money
and the nonsettling defendant would be entitled to the credit.
If the Gullen court's treatment of the Mary Carter agreement turned upon
the fact that the plaintiff had actually received the payment, the possibility
remains that a credit for the nonsettling defendant would not be appropriate
in the case of a Mary Carter agreement in which the settling tortfeasor will
make no actual payment to the plaintiff until the litigation against the nonsettling defendant is resolved.1 29 Assuming, however, that a court is willing to

124. Id., 507 P.2d at 361. The result in Cullen was also reached in Bolton v. Ziegler, 111 F.
Supp. 516, 531 (N.D. Iowa 1953), in which the court stated, "The basis of the Iowa rule of pro
tanto reduction is the prevention of unjust recoveries. There is no reason for assuming that the
Iowa Supreme Court is concerned only with the prevention of unjust recoveries by claimants and
has. no concern as to unjust recoveries by joint tortfeasors."
125. 211 Kan. at 377, 507 P.2d at 362. In Monjay v. Evergreen School Dist. No. 114, 13
Wash. App. 654, 660, 537 P.2d 825, 829 (1975), the court followed Bolton v. Ziegler, 111 F.
Supp. 516 (N.D. Iowa) in holding that a Mary Carter agreement's repayment clause was void
because it violated the state's prohibition against contribution among tortfcasors. The court did
not, however, treat the agreement as an unconditional settlement. The court gave the plaintiff an
option. She could either affirm the agreement as final and accept a reduction of her judgment
against the nonsettling tortfeasor, or she could rescind the agreement and the court would order
a new trial. Id. at 662, 537 P.2d at 830; see also Tober v. Hampton, 178 Neb. 858, 876, 136
N.W.2d 194, 205 (1965) (Mary Carter loan receipt thwarted Nebraska law prohibiting indemnification and contribution among tortfeasors; plaintiffs' claim dismissed because they were no longer
real parties in interest) (overruled by Royal Indem. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 193 Neb.
752, 229 N.W.2d 183 (1975) to the extent that Tober held negligent joint tortfeasors not entitled
to contribution); Thornton & Wick, supra note 3, at 238 (advocating pro tanto credit for Mary
Carter agreements). Contra Jensen v. Beaird, 40 Wash. App. 1, 7, 696 P.2d 612, 618 (1985)
(rejecting Monjay).
126. See supra notes 124-25 and infra notes 130, 141 & 151.
127. See generally supra note 6.
128. 211 Kan. at 377, 507 P.2d at 362.
129. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 9-12. This reasoning was applied by the court
in Hemet Dodge v. Gryder, 23 Ariz. App. 523, 530, 534 P.2d 454, 461 (1975), in which the
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30
take the approach of rewriting the parties' agreement, as the Cullen court did,'
the fact of advance payment should not be significant. In the case of a Mary
Carter agreement that is not a loan receipt, the court could hold that the promise
the
to pay the guaranteed amount is unconditional and, consequently, entitles
1
nonsettling defendant to the appropriate pro tanto or pro rata credit. 31

Mary Carter agreements become much less attractive when courts adopt a
rule that provides a credit for the nonsettling defendant on the basis of such
an agreement. Under this circumstance, it is impossible for the plaintiff to
achieve full satisfaction from the nonsettling defendant because any judgment

is reduced, either by the amount of the Mary Carter agreement guarantee (pro
tanto) or by the settling defendant's pro rata share of the judgment.'32 Either
the plaintiff is unable to achieve a complete recovery because the agreement
does not require the settling defendant to pay if there is a verdict for the
guaranteed amount or more against the nonsettling defendant, or the settling
defendant pays the guaranteed amount, as in Cullen, in spite of a verdict for
all the damages against the nonsettling defendant. In either case, the nonsettling
defendant is not required to contribute the entire portion of liability that the
parties to the Mary Carter agreement contemplated he would be forced to
contribute.
The credit approach to Mary Carter agreements, however, does not entirely
eliminate their use. A settling defendant will still be willing to enter into a

court's entire response to nonsettling defendant's motion for credit was that "no money was actually
paid to the plaintiff under the covenant prior to judgment. Since no money was paid, the rule
pertaining to credit . .. does not apply."
130. The approach of converting a Mary Carter agreement into a final settlement was criticized
by the court in Bass v. Phoenix Seadrill/78 Ltd., 749 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1985). The district court
in Bass found that the Mary Carter agreement was unfair to the plaintiff, a seaman, and that it
acted as a deterrent to settlement with the remaining defendants. In entering judgment, therefore,
the court enforced the agreement as if it were a straight settlement. Id. at 1158. The Court of
Appeals reversed, not because it necessarily approved of Mary Carter agreements, id. at 1158 nn.6
& 7, but because it disagreed with the district court's finding that the plaintiff and nonsettling
defendants had been adversely prejudiced by the agreement. Id. at 1160-65. Moreover, the court
stated, "We have grave doubts whether a district court faced with an unenforceable settlement
provision can simply write the offensive provision out of the agreement and effectively bind the
parties to a deal they never contemplated." Id. at 1165 n.19. See generally Note, Maty CarterAgreements
in Maritime Personal Injuy Suits, 22 S. TEx. L.J. 545 (1982).
131. This result appears to have occurred in the recent case of Schick v. Rodenburg, 397
N.W.2d 464 (S.D. 1986), in which the court held that the nonsettling defendants were entitled to
a credit of $200,000 on the basis of a Mary Carter agreement that provided for an $85,000 loan
and an additional $115,000 guarantee if the plaintiff recovered less than $200,000 from the nonsettling defendants.
132. In the case of proportionate credit in a comparative fault system, see supra note 116,
Mary Carter agreements are less deterred. The settling parties may succeed at trial in assuring
that only a small percentage of fault, if any, is attributed to the settling defendant. Thus, the
nonsettling defendant's liability to the plaintiff would be reduced only minimally, if at all. See Unfair
and Unnecessary, supra note 3, at 800; Case Note, supra note 59, at 588; infra note 161. But see Mary
Carter in Michigan, supra note 3, at 640 (reducing a plaintiff's recovery against nonsettling defendants
by the settling defendant's comparative fault will make Mary Carter agreements less attractive to
more culpable defendants unable to avoid a large percentage allocation of fault).
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Mary Garter agreement if the opportunity exists to limit or escape liability. A
plaintiff may be willing to accept something less than full recovery from the
nonsettling defendant in exchange for the guarantee of some recovery from the
settling defendant and the settling defendant's assistance at trial in maximizing
133
the verdict against the nonsettling defendant.
The credit rule also fails to address the problem of trial unfairness caused
by these agreements. In Ward v. Ochoa,1 34 the Florida Fourth District Court of
Appeal ordered the plaintiff to produce a previously undisclosed Mary Carter
agreement and permitted the nonsettling defendants to apply to the trial court
for a pro tanto credit toward the judgment against them.' 35 The Supreme Court
of Florida, however, concluding that a "set-off in favor of the petitioners would
be insufficient in correcting possible injustice," ordered a new trial at which
36
the Mary Carter agreement would be admissible in evidence.
Courts in some jurisdictions have rejected the argument that the credit rule
should be applied to Mary Carter agreements because they are inimical to the
policy against contribution. The classic statement of this position is found in
Reese v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad,'37 in which the Supreme Court of
Illinois reversed a trial judge's decision that had converted a Mary Carter loan
agreement into an unconditional covenant not to sue and reduced the plaintiffs
verdict by the "loan" amount. 38 The supreme court framed the issue as,
"whether our policy of denying contribution between joint tortfeasors outweighs
the considerations favoring private settlement of lawsuits."' 39 The court acknowledged that a Mary Carter agreement permits a joint tortfeasor to do
indirectly what he may not do directly. The court reasoned, however, that "the
principal objection to contribution - use of the courts for relief of wrongdoers

133. For instance, a plaintiff may value his claim at $600, but believe that his chances of
winning at trial are small if both defendants defend vigorously. He enters into a Mary Carter
agreement with one defendant that guarantees recovery of $200. If the verdict against the nonsettling
defendant is less than $200, the settling defendant will pay the plaintiff the difference between the
verdict and $200. If the verdict exceeds $200, the settling defendant pays nothing. The verdict is
for the full claim - $600. Under a pro tanto credit rule, the plaintiff's judgment against the
nonsettling defendant, and ultimate recovery, will be $400; under a pro rata rule, it will be $300.
In Unfair and Unnecessary, supra note 3, at 799, the writer concludes that even pro rata reduction
on the basis of a Mary Carter agreement will not eliminate their use because the plaintiff may
believe that enlisting the support at trial of one defendant will produce the maximum possible
recovery, notwithstanding the reduction. With regard to a comparative fault system, see infra note
161.
134. 271 So. 2d 173, 174 (4th D.O.A.), modified, 284 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973).
135. Id.
136. Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385, 388 (Fla. 1973). The court also specifically rejected
the views expressed in Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1967).
284 So. 2d at 388.
137. 55 Ill. 2d 356, 303 N.E.2d 382 (1973).
138. Id. at 358-59, 303 N.E.2d at 385; accord Hemet Dodge v. Gryder, 23 Ariz. App. 523,
530, 534 P.2d 454, 461 (1975); Jensen v. Beaird, 40 Wash. App. 1, 7, 696 P.2d 612, 618 (1985).
The plaintiff in Reese received $57,500 repayable from any judgment collected against the nonsettling
defendant. The judgment obtained was $149,000. Under the trial judge's holding, the plaintiff was
not obligated to repay the loan. 55 Ill. 2d at 358-59, 303 N.E.2d at 383-84.
139. 55 Ill. 2d at 363, 303 N.E.2d at 386.
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is absent from this private, out-of-court arrangement." 140 The court next

asserted that Mary Carter agreements have "salutory effects" including that
"funds under this arrangement will be more readily offered to injured plaintiffs"
and that these agreements "may tend to simplify complex multiparty litigation,
and are desirable from the standpoint of facilitating private resolution of litigation." 1 4' Thus, because there was no reduction in the plaintiff s verdict against
the nonsettling defendant and because Illinois law did not provide contribution
among tortfeasors, the settling defendant in Reese was able to use a Mary Carter
42
agreement successfully to shift all liability to the nonsettling defendant.

Jurisdictions that permit contribution among joint tortfeasors retain pro rata,
pro tanto, or proportionate reduction rules 43 and provide that a defendant who

settles with the plaintiff is not permitted to obtain contribution from other
tortfeasors whose liability has not been extinguished by the settlement. 4 4 The
benefit to the settling defendant is that he is released from liability to the plaintiff
and possibly from liability to other tortfeasors for contribution. 4 In Alder v.
Garcia,146 the court refused to enforce a Mary Carter agreement because it had

the effect of providing contribution to a settling defendant in contravention of
New Mexico's Contribution Among Joint Tort Feasors Act.1 47 The issue arose
in Alder in a somewhat unusual fashion. The plaintiffs suit against the first

tortfeasor was settled through a Mary Carter agreement that gave the plaintiff
$40,000 in exchange for a release of liability and an assignment to the settling
tortfeasor of half of any recovery against the nonsettling tortfeasor not to exceed
$80,000. During the subsequent trial, the nonsettling tortfeasor learned of the

140. Id. at 363-64, 303 N.E.2d at 386. Arguably because the plaintiff's success will benefit
the settling defendant, the court is being used to benefit a "wrongdoer."
141. Id., 303 N.E.2d at 386. Dissenting in Reese, Justice Schaefer, joined by two others, argued
that the Mary Carter agreement increases, rather than diminishes, litigation and unjustly gives the
settling defendant a chance to avoid any financial loss. Id. at 365-68, 303 N.E.2d at 387-88.
In Popovich v. Ram Pipe & Supply Co., 82 Ill. 2d 203, 412 N.E.2d 518 (1980) and Palmer
v. Avco. Distrib. Corp., 82 111.2d 211, 412 N.E.2d 959 (1980), the Illinois Supreme Court held
that loans not repayable under a Mary Carter agreement must be set off. In Palmer, the plaintiff
would retain the $266,000 loan because the judgment against the nonsettling defendant was $492,000
and the agreement required repayment only if the verdict exceeded $500,000. The supreme court
required a credit to prevent double recovery for the plaintiff. 82 Ill.
2d at 223-26, 412 N.E.2d at
965-67. A new trial on damages only was granted, however, so that the jury might be informed
of the effect of the agreement. Id. at 227, 412 N.E.2d at 967. The jury thus will be able to
increase the damages to an amount that will provide the Reese result - a repayment of the loan
to the settling defendant and full recovery for the plaintiff from the nonsettling defendant. Justice
Ryan dissented from this handling of loan agreements because settling defendants may still use
these agreements to escape liability. Id. at 233-34, 412 N.E.2d at 970 ("I view this case as a
fulfillment of the prophesy [sic] of Mr. Justice Schaefer in the dissent in Reese.").
142. 55 11. 2d at 363, 303 N.E.2d at 386.
143. See supra note 116.
144. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION ANIONG TORTFEASORS ACT (1939) § 2(3), 12 U.L.A. 57 (1975); UNF.
COrTRImUTION AMtONG TORTFAsORs ACT (1955), § 1(d), 12 U.L.A. 63 (1975); UNiF. COMPARATIVE
FAULT ACT § 4(b), 12 U.L.A. 44 (Supp. 1986).
145. See infia notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
146. 324 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1963).
147. Id. at 485.
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assignment. It then settled with the plaintiff by paying him $40,000 and promising to indemnify him in any suit by the settling tortfeasor to enforce the
assignment. The original settling tortfeasor then brought suit to enforce the
assignment against both the plaintiff and the tortfeasor who had settled at trial.' 48
The court of appeals pointed out that the Uniform Joint Tort Feasors Act
of New Mexico provided that a release from the plaintiff did not relieve a
settling tortfeasor of liability for contribution unless the release provided for a
pro rata reduction of the plaintiffs damages against all other tortfeasors and,
further, that a settling tortfeasor in such a case was not entitled to contribution
from other tortfeasors.' 49 The court denied enforcement because the agreement
benefitted the settling defendant in a manner contrary to the public policy of
New Mexico.'5 0 The Alder holding gave a Mary Carter agreement the effect of
a final partial settlement in which the settling defendant was released from
liability to the plaintiff, but received no contribution from the remaining defend5

ant.1 1

148. Id. at 483-84.
149. Id. at 485.
150. Id.; see also Atlantic Ambulance & Convalescent Serv., Inc. v. Asbury, 330 So. 2d 477
(Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975) (where plaintiff and codefendant had agreement limiting liability, amount
of verdict rendered against other defendants entitled to reduction by amount of codefendant's
agreement). Contra Slaughter v. Pennsylvania X-ray Corp., 638 F.2d 639, 644 (3d Cir. 1981).
In Marathon Oil Co. v. Mid-Continent Underwriters, 786 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1986), similar
to an attempt to avoid a prohibition against contribution, an obligor sought to use a Mary Carter
agreement to avoid a waiver of subrogation clause. As in Alder, the nonsettling defendant, upon
learning of the agreement, settled with the original plaintiff and directly confronted the settling
defendant's attempt to shift liability. The original plaintiff, Tye, a seaman, had sued three defendants
for injuries he sustained at an oil platform. The defendant boat lessor had obtained an insurance
policy from British Underwriters, which also covered defendant Marathon, the lessee, as an additional assured. The policy also waived subrogation rights against Marathon. Underwriters, however, settled with Tye for $60,000, with a "side letter" in which Tye agreed to pay Underwriters
the first $30,000 he recovered in his suit against Marathon. When Marathon learned of the settlement agreement, it paid Tye $85,000 and sued Underwriters to recover all or part of the $30,000
that Tye was required to pay Underwriters under the agreement. Id. at 1303. The court agreed
with Marathon that Underwriters was barred by the waiver of subrogation clause from recovering
any of its $60,000 settlement with Tye from Marathon. It then stated, "What British Underwriters
could not do directly by suit in their own name, they cannot do indirectly, by using Tye as their
cat's paw." Id. at 1304. The court then found that the Mary Carter agreement had damaged
Marathon because Tye would not settle with Marathon for less that $85,000, even though he would
have accepted $55,000 from Marathon if he had been able to keep all of Underwriter's $60,000
settlement. The court awarded Marathon $27,500 against Underwriters. Id.
151. But see Palmer v. Avco Distrib. Corp., 82 Ill. 2d 211, 224, 412 N.E.2d 959, 966 (1980),
in which the court noted that Illinois' contribution statute, adopted in 1979, evidences a policy of
protecting the financial interest of nonsettling parties in a settlement. Nevertheless, the court held
that amounts paid to a plaintiff under a Mary Carter loan agreement, which the plaintiff would
return to the settling defendant from recovery against the nonsettling defendant, would not be
credited against the judgment. Id. at 227, 412 N.E.2d at 967; see also Webb v. Dessert Seed Co.,
718 P.2d 1057 (Colo. 1986), in which the trial court, pursuant to the Unif. Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act, reduced the plaintiffs' verdict by the $200,000 they received under a Mary Carter
loan receipt. Id. at 1061 n.5. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed this reduction, reasoning
simply that the plaintiffs would not receive double recovery because the agreement required them
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A different approach to Mary Carter agreements consistent with permitting
contribution among tortfeasors is to hold that a Mary Carter agreement is not
a settlement at all for purposes of either crediting a judgment against nonsettling
tortfeasors or relieving the settling defendant of liability for contribution. 5 2 Mary
Carter agreements can successfully subvert systems of contribution among tortfeasors only if the parties to the agreement are permitted to have it both ways
- to treat the agreement as a settlement that relieves the settling defendant
of liability for contribution, yet not give any credit to the nonsettling tortfeasors.
C.

Deterring Mary Carter Agreements by Allowing Contribution for the Nonsettling

Party
Several writers have suggested that where a duty of contribution among
joint tortfeasors exists, Mary Carter agreements will be eliminated. They reason
that a defendant has no incentive to enter into a Mary Carter agreement and
to strive to achieve a large plaintiff's verdict if he may still be liable to a
53
codefendant for contribution in the event of a judgment against them both.'
Thus, even if a Mary Carter agreement is not foiled by allowing a credit against
the nonsettling party's liability to the plaintiff,'5 4 it may be foiled by retaining
the settling defendant's duty of contribution.
While contribution may eliminate some of the attractiveness of Mary Carter
agreements, it does not completely eliminate their use.' 55 One reason for this
is that cooperation between the parties to a Mary Carter agreement creates the
possibility of a verdict that absolves the settling defendant of liability to the
plaintiff, in which case the settling defendant will not be liable for contribution.' 6 In addition, some courts have held that settling defendants are not liable
for contribution even without a verdict in their favor because their Mary Carter

to transfer $200,000 to the settling defendant. Id. at 1068. The court acknowledged that under the

agreement, the settling obligor was not only relieved of liability, but could actually recover more
than it paid the plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the arrangement was not objectionable because the plaintiffs'

claims were "freely assignable" under Colorado law. Id. In Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503
F.2d 506, 511 n.9 (9th Cir. 1974), the court expressed no opinion as to whether, for purposes of

Alaska's contribution act, the plaintiff's claim would be reduced on the basis of the "loaned"
funds.
152. See infra § II.C.
153. See Taylor v. DiRico, 124 Ariz. 513, 520, 606 P.2d 3, 10 (1980) (Gordon, J., concurring);
Freedman, supra note 6, at 617-19; Unsettling Contributions, supra note 1, at 148; Note, The Mary

CarterAgreement - Solving the Problems of Collusive Settlements in Joint Tort Actions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV.
1393, 1406-07 (1974); see also Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385, 388 (Fla. 1973) (Deckle, Jr.,
concurring) (it is essential to remove the limitation imposed by the rule against the division of
liability among joint tortfeasors).
154. See supra § II.B.
155.
156.

Unfair and Unnecessary, supra note 3, at 798-99; Case Note, supra note 59, at 588.
CoNrntsnurroN AMONO ToRTF-AsoRs ACT (1955) § 3(0, 12 U.L.A. 89 (1975) pro-

UNIF.

vides: "The judgment of the court in determining the liability of the several defendants to the
claimant for an injury or wrongful death shall be binding as among such defendants in determining
their right to contribution." The Commissioners' Comment states:
Subsection (0. Res Adjudicata. This seems necessary in view of the position some
courts have taken that adjudication of liability to the plaintiff of several defendants is not
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settlement with the plaintiff absolves them of liability for contribution., 7 If a settling
defendant avoids contribution, either through a favorable verdict or because he
has "settled" with the plaintiff, and at the same time avoids crediting the
plaintiffs verdict on account of the settlement, the Mary Garter agreement will
have accomplished a shifting of all liability to the nonsettling defendant.
This result is less likely in a jursdiction with the 1939 version of the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act because under its provisions, a settling
tortfeasor is released from contribution only if the settlement provides for a
reduction of the plaintiffs claim by the settling tortfeasor's pro rata share.'5
This provision, however, deters not only Mary Carter agreements, 15t but all
partial settlements. 6 For that very reason, the more widely followed 1955 renecessarily res adjudicata of the liability for determination of contribution claims. Obviously,
the defendants should be bound as among themselves by the adjudication of their liability
to the claimant.
Id. at 90-91; see also TENN. CODE ANN. 5 29-11-104(0 (1980) (judgment determining liability of
several defendants shall be binding among the defendants in determining contribution or indemnity);
Bible & Godwin Constr. Co. v. Faener Corp., 504 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Tenn. 1974) (judgment in
favor of defendant bars codefendants' claim of contribution or indemnity). A Mary Carter agreement
increases the likelihood of a verdict in favor of the settling defendant, of course, because the plaintiff
has no incentive to obtain a judgment against the settling defendant and will cooperate with him.
See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
157. See infra notes 186-95 and accompanying text.
158. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AhtoNo ToRTFEAsoRs ACT (1939) § 5, 12 U.L.A. 58 (1975). Nevertheless, if the settling defendant is absolved of liability at trial, and the plaintiff obtains a verdict
against the nonsettling defendant, the liability shifting could be accomplished. In Arkansas, where
the 1939 uniform act is in effect, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1001 to -1009 (1962), such a result was
obtained in the second trial in Shelton v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 281 Ark. 100, 662 S.W.2d
473 (1984). The judgment against the nonsettling defendant and in favor of the other defendants
was reversed, however, because of the undisclosed Mary Carter agreement. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Little, 276 Ark. 511, 639 S.W.2d 726 (1982); see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Little, 269 Ark. 636, 599 S.W.2d 756 (Ark. 1980) (first trial). On retrial, all defendants were
found liable. Shelton, 281 Ark. at 102, 662 S.W.2d at 474.
One nonsettling defendant then sought contribution from the settling defendant, which wasdenied by the trial court. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed. The court stated, "The 'Mary
Carter' agreement should not have been the basis for relieving Shelton [settling defendant] of his
share of the liability determined by the jury." Id. at 103, 662 S.W.2d at 475. Illustrative of the
lengths to which plaintiffs will go to obtain a Mary Carter guarantee, the agreement in Shelton
combined a Mary Carter agreement with a Pierringer release. See infra note 160. The plaintiff in
Shelton had agreed to hold the settling defendant and his insurance carrier harmless from claims
for contribution against them. 281 Ark. at 102, 662 S.W.2d at 474. Thus, in this case, the plaintiff
bore the risk of the court's unwillingness to cooperate in the liability shifting scheme.
159. But see supra note 133.
160. See UNIF. CoNRIBUTION AMONO ToRTFAsoRs ACT (1955) S 4, Commissioners' Comment
to subsection (b), 12 U.L.A. 99-100 (1975). Not surprisingly, a settlement device has developed
that is designed to overcome the impediment of pro rata credit, particularly in jurisdictions that
have comparative negligence. The Pierringer release is an agreement between a plaintiff and a
potential tortfeasor that (1) releases the settling tortfeasor from the lawsuit and discharges that part
of the plaintiff's claim attributable to the settling tortfeasor; (2) reserves the balance of the claim
against the nonsettling tortfeasor; and (3) contains an agreement whereby the plaintiff indemnifies
the settling tortfeasor from any claims of contribution made by the nonsettling tortfeasors and agrees
to satisfy any judgment he obtains from the nonsettling tortfeasors to the extent attributable to the
settling tortfeasor's causal fault. See, e.g., Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918, 920-22 (Minn. 1978).
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vision requires only pro tanto reduction and provides for the release of the
settling defendant from contribution so long as the settlement was in good
faith. ,

The effect of a Pierringer release is that the plaintiff takes the risk of the jurisdiction's requirements
for equitable sharing of liability among tortfeasors. The plaintiff accepts the risk that the amount
he receives in settlement is less than either the amount of contribution other tortfeasors will be
entitled to from the settling tortfeasor or the amount of the judgment attributable to the settling
tortfeasor. See also Lavoie v. Celotex Corp., 505 A.2d 481 (Me. 1986); Frederickson v. Alton M.
Johnson Co., 390 N.W.2d 786 (Minn. 1986) (Pierringer release mandated 40% reduction of verdict);
Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963) (seminal case). See generally V.
ScHwARTz, supra note 105, § 16.6, at 255-56; Hirshon, Release of Defendants in Multiparty Litigation,
26 FOR TE DEF., Feb. 1984, at 27; Simonett, Release of Joint Torfeasors: Use of the Pierringer Release
in Minnesota, 3 W.t. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 3 (1977). If, on the other hand, it is determined at
the trial against the nonsettling defendant that the settling defendant was not at fault, the plaintiff
retains the settlement amount as well as any amounts recovered from the nonsettling defendant.
Shantz v. Richview, Inc., 311 N.W.2d 155 (Minn. 1980). This is true because under a Pierringer
arrangement, there is no credit on the basis of the settlement. The settling tortfeasor remains
potentially liable for contribution, which is barred if no fault is attributed to the settling tortfeasor
at trial. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. The Pierringer arrangement runs afoul of the
1955 Act, however, because under that Act, the nonsettling defendant is entitled to a credit based
upon the settlement amount. See infra note 161; Schick v. Rodenburg, 397 N.W.2d 464, 469 (S.D.
1986) (holding that Pierringer agreement permits a double recovery and, therefore, contravenes
South Dakota public policy).
Within the context of pro rata credit and comparative fault, Pierringer arrangements appear to
be fair to nonsettling defendants because the nonsettling defendant is protected from paying amounts
attributable to the fault of the settling tortfeasor. Nevertheless, the success of a Pierringer arrangement for the plaintiff depends upon a low allocation of fault to the settling defendant. Courts and
juries, therefore, should be informed of the Pierringer arrangement and how it may bias the
plaintiff's conduct at trial.
161. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRTFE~soas ACT (1955) § 4, 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975) provides:
When a release or covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good
faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful
death:
(a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or
wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim against the others to
the extent of any amount stipulated by the release of the covenant, or in the amount of
the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and,
(b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution
to any other tortfeasor.
See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-11-105 (1980) (follows 1955 version).
The good faith requirement does not appear in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. The settling
defendant is automatically released from contribution and the plaintiff's claim is reduced by the
settling defendant's proportionate share of causal fault. UNIF. COMPAR.ATIVE FAULT ACT § 6, 12
U.L.A. 45-46 (Supp. 1986). The Comment to § 6 acknowledges that this provision may discourage
claimants from entering into partial settlements. See generally V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 105, §§ 16.7.8. In 2 COMiPARATVE NEGLIGENCE 5 13.50[2], at 13-63 (Matthew Bender & Co. 1985), Professor
Little suggests that this weakness in the Comparative Fault Act can be remedied by an amendment
providing that the plaintiffs claim is reduced by the amount of the released person's equitable
share "or the amount of the consideration paid for the release whichever is less."
A Mary Carter agreement may work well for the agreeing parties under the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. With a Mary Carter agreement, the parties may believe that they can achieve
at trial a minimal attribution of fault to the settling defendant. In that case, whether the agreement
is treated as a settlement reducing the plaintiff's claim, or whether it still leaves the settling defendant
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While one student of Mary Carter agreements considered it "highly unlikely
that courts would find a Mary Carter agreement to be a good faith settlement
due to its potential for collusion,' ' 6 2 another predicted that "the nebulous standard of 'good faith' may not be sufficient protection against collusive settlements.' 1 63 Courts are, in fact, split on whether a Mary Carter agreement may
be a good faith settlement. One Tennessee federal district court has given an
emphatic "no" in response to a request to find a Mary Carter agreement in
good faith. 164 Florida courts have taken an ad hoc approach'65 and California
66
courts have generally answered "yes.'
In the Tennessee case, Florow v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad (In re Waverly
Accident of Februaiy 22-24, 1978), 67 the plaintiff and one defendant entered into
a settlement agreement that included both an unconditional settlement for
$33,333.33 and a Mary Carter guarantee for $66,666.67.68 The agreement
provided that the plaintiff could not settle with any other defendant for less
than $33,333.33 without the settling defendant's approval. It also required the
plaintiff to pursue to final judgment her claim against the nonsettling
defendants. 169 The nonsettling defendant crossclaimed for contribution and the
settling defendant moved for partial summary judgment dismissing the crossclaim on the grounds that it had entered into a good faith settlement with the
plaintiff. 170 The federal district court, applying section 4 of the 1955 revised
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act as adopted in Tennessee, 7 1 gave
three reasons for holding the Mary Carter agreement not in good faith and
2
refusing to discharge the settling defendant from the duty of contribution.1
First, the court found that "the agreement frustrates the statutory goal of

liable for contribution on the basis of his proportionate fault, the loss may be small in comparison
with the recovery against the nonsettling tortfeasor. See Unfair and Unnecessary, supra note 3, at 799-

800.
162. Note, supra note 153, at 1407; see also Wesierski, May Carter Agreements and Good Faith
Settlaments - Are They Both Possible in California?, 48 INs. COUNS. J. 639, 648 (1981) (concluding
that Mary Carter agreements will not be considered good faith settlements in California). But see
infra notes 186-99 and accompanying text.
163. Unfair and Unnecessary, supra note 3, at 798. See generally 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0.
GRAY, supra note 9, 5 10.2, at 56 (noting that a settlement amount may be low even when the
settlement is in good faith and that the good faith requirement poses difficulties of proof).
164. See infra text accompanying notes 167-77.
165. See infra text accompanying notes 178-84.
166. See infra text accompanying notes 186-99.
167. 502 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn. 1979).
168. Id. at 2.
169. Id. at 5.
170. Id. at 2.
171. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-11-105 (1980); supra note 161.
172. The settling defendant surprisingly conceded that a Mary Carter agreement is in bad
faith, but argued that the agreement should bar contribution because it included a substantial
unconditional amount, for which the nonsettling defendants would receive a pro tanto credit. 502
F. Supp. at 3-4. The court responded that if the agreement were simply a release of the defendant
in exchange for $33,333.33, it "would probably uphold the contract's validity." Id. at 4. Contra
Torres v. Union Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (Ct. App. 1984) (settlement
that included $50,000 unconditional payment and $150,000 guarantee was in good faith).
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encouraging settlements.' 1 73 Second, it found that the agreement was a collusive
attempt by the parties to obtain contribution for the settling defendant in contravention of the contribution statutes, which provided that a settling defendant
was not entitled to contribution from defendants who were not released from
liability to the plaintiff by the settlement agreement. 74 Finally, the court was
"disturbed that the agreement require[d] plaintiff to continue to prosecute her
action against movant even though the controversy between them is settled.' 75
The court in Florow not only denied the settling defendant's motion with
regard to contribution, but also stated that the Mary Carter agreement was
"void" and invalid "in toto."' 76 The effect of those conclusions is unclear. 77
Nevertheless, because no Tennessee decisions on the validity of Mary Carter
agreements existed, the court wrote on a clean slate in determining the good
faith nature of such an agreement.
In other jurisdictions, the good faith issue is complicated by prior judicial
or legislative approval of the use of Mary Carter agreements. In Florida, where
178
Mary Carter agreements had long been permitted and regulated by the courts,
the first appellate court to consider the contribution issue, in Frier's Inc. v.
Seaboard Coastline Railroad,179 stated that it was "not prepared to say that all
Mary Carter agreements lack the essential good faith element."'180 Because the
trial court had made no determination of whether the agreement was in good
faith within the meaning of the contribution act and because the record was

173. 502 F. Supp. at 5.
174. Id. (citing Alder v. Garcia, 324 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1963)); see supra text accompanying
notes 146-51.
175. 502 F. Supp. at 6 (citing Lum v. Stinnett, 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971)); see supra
§ II.A. The court noted that some jurisdictions permit this practice if the settlement agreement is
revealed to the jury. It observed, however, that this might not be possible in Tennessee under
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-11-105(b) (1980) (formerly § 23-3105(c)). Id. at 6-7. &e infra text accompanying note 216. The court apparently assumed that federal law would not control on this issue
in federal court. If it did, FED. R. EVID. 408 would permit the agreement to be admitted to show
bias or prejudice of a witness. The court concluded that it was not
compelled to resolve this difficult question of state law, nor to determine whether or not
an agreement that requires the contracting parties to present an illusory controversy to the
jury would fail for that sole reason to satisfy the requirement of good faith under § 233105(b). The court does believe that this aspect of the instant agreement, combined with
the infirmities already discussed, provide ample reason to invalidate the agreement in toto
and to hold that it does not discharge movant from its obligation of contribution to respondents.
502 F. Supp. at 7.
176. Id.
177. Although the only motion before the court was the partial summary judgment on contribution, the court stated that it "must still determine the position of the parties with respect to
the prior $33,333.33 payment." It concluded that "the best solution is to allow plaintiff to retain
that sum as an advance payment on any judgment that may be rendered against L & N [settling
defendant]." Id.
178. See Florida cases collected in Case Note, supra note 59, at 574 n.24.
179. 355 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978).
180. Id. at 211. Florida adopted the 1955 revised version of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasor's Act in 1975. FLA. STAT. Ama. § 768.31 (West Supp. 1986).
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incomplete, the court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue. 81 Subsequently, in Diaz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., ' a Florida appellate
court approved a trial judge's refusal to give good faith treatment to a Mary
Carter agreement for purposes of relieving the settling defendants of a duty of
contribution. 18 3 The Diaz court stated, "In the instant case, there is more than
ample evidence of Sear's [sic] bad faith as demonstrated by the agreement on
8 4
its face and Sear's [sic] collusion with the plaintiffs in the trying of their case."'
Arguably, even where Mary Carter agreements are valid between the parties
to the agreement, they should not be permitted to relieve the settling defendant
of his duty of contribution to the nonsettling defendant, so long as the agreement
does not trigger a reduction in the plaintiffs claim against the nonsettling party.
With regard to the rights of the nonsettling defendant, a Mary Carter agreement
cannot be in good faith within the meaning of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act when its effect is to shift all liability to the nonsettling defendant.' 8
Courts may permit the plaintiff or the settling defendant to exchange, respectively, a reduction in the judgment or a potential duty of contribution, for the
other agreeing party's cooperation in obtaining a large verdict against the nonsettling defendant. Courts should not permit, however, the placement of all
liability on the nonsettling defendant, which is the consequence if the Mary
Carter agreement does not reduce the plaintiff's claim but relieves the settling
defendant from contribution.
Shifting all liability through a Mary Carter agreement, nevertheless, is exactly what occurred in California, although California law follows the pattern
of the 1955 Uniform Act, including pro tanto reduction of a plaintiff's judgment
in case of settlement with a joint tortfeasor, a duty of contribution and a good
faith standard for relieving settling parties from contribution. 8 6 The California
experience is atypical because a California statute specifically addresses Mary
Carter (sliding scale recovery) agreements, although the statute does not deal

181. 355 So. 2d at 211-12.
182. 475 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985).
183. Id. at 934.
184. Id. The court also considered the text of the agreement in affirming the trial court's
decision to advise the jury of its terms instead of admitting it into evidence. Id. The court found
the agreement to be "self-serving and inflammatory." Id. at 933. The court did not explain how
Sears had colluded with the plaintiffs at trial. Id. at 934.
185. The purpose of the contribution act is to provide for equitable sharing of liability among
those jointly liable. See supra note 113. In River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal.
App. 3d 986, 995-96, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498, 504 (Ct. App. 1972), the court stated that the purpose
of the good faith clause of the contribution act is to aid the twin statutory objectives of equitable
sharing of the burden of compensating plaintiffs and of encouraging settlements. This analysis was
approved in Florow, 502 F. Supp. at 4. Cf. In re MGM Grand Hotel Fire Litigation, 570 F. Supp.
913, 931-33 (D. Nev. 1983) (settlement that included some aspects of a Mary Carter guarantee
was approved as in good faith because the nonsettling defendants would receive a full pro tanto
credit); Trampe v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 214 Wis. 210, 216-17, 252 N.W. 675, 677-78 (1934)
(although Mary Carter agreement held to release nonsettling defendant, settling defendant not
entitled to contribution because purpose of secret settlement to throw burden on codefendant was
not in good faith).
186.

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 55 875-880 (West 1980).
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555

with problems of credit or contribution for the nonsettling defendant." 7 The
significance of the statute for these issues is that the California courts have
been unwilling to deny good faith status to a device that has been approved,
not just judicially, as in Florida, but also legislatively. In Burlington Northern
Railroad v. Superior Court,"' the California Court of Appeal stated:

Given the legislative approval of sliding scale agreements, however, the
trial court's finding of unfairness cannot support a conclusion that the
settlement was not made in good faith. This is so even when a nonsettling
tortfeasor has been required to pay the entire compensation without contribution or indemnity from the settling joint tortfeasor. 1 9
Although Burlington Northern was widely followed in California decisions affording good faith treatment to Mary Carter agreements, 9 its holding is now

187. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.5 (West 1980) provides:
Sliding scale recovery agreement; disclosure to court and jury
(a) Where an agreement or covenant is made which provides for a sliding scale recovery
agreement between one or more, but not all, alleged defendant tortfeasors and the plaintiff
or plaintiffs:
(1) The parties entering into any such agreement or convenant shall promptly inform
the court in which the action is pending of the existence of the agreement or covenant
and its terms and provisions; and
(2) If the action is tried before a jury, and a defendant party to the agreement is
a witness, the court shall, upon motion of a party, disclose to the jury the existence and
content of the agreement or covenant, unless the court finds that such disclosure will create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.
The jury disclosure herein required shall be no more than necessary to be sure
that the jury understands (1) the essential nature of the agreement, but not including the
amount paid, or any contingency, and (2) the possibility that the agreement may bias the
testimony of the alleged tortfeasor or tortfeasors who entered into the agreement.
(b) As used in this section, a "sliding scale recovery agreement" means an agreement
or covenant between a plaintiff or plaintiffs and one or more, but not all, alleged tortfeasor
defendants, where the agreement limits the liability of the agreeing tortfeasor defendants
to an amount which is dependent upon the amount of recovery which the plaintiff is able
to recover from the nonagreeing defendant or defendants. This includes, but is not limited
to, agreements within the scope of section 877, and agreements in the form of a loan from
the agreeing tortfeasor defendant to the plaintiff or plaintiffs which is repayable in whole
or in part from the recovery against the nonagreeing tortfeasor defendant.
One of the unique problems in California has been whether the good faith requirement applies to
sliding scale agreements at all because § 877.5 does not refer to this requirement. For an excellent
discussion of the problem in California and in general, see Sliding Scale Agreements, supra note 1.
188. 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 187 Cal. Rptr. 376 (Ct. App. 1982).
189. Id. at 948, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
190. See Anderson v. International Harvester Co., 165 Cal. App. 3d 100, 211 Cal. Rptr. 253
(Ct. App. 1985); City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 489, 206 Cal. Rptr.
674 (Ct. App. 1984), vacated and remanded, 176 Cal. App. 3d 856, 222 Cal. Rptr. 562 (Ct. App.
1986) (following Burlington Northern and rejecting constitutional attack on sliding scale agreements);
Imperial Spa, Inc. v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. App. 3d 1185, 205 Cal. Rptr. 337 (Ct. App.
1984) ("In denying hearing, the [California] Supreme Court ordered that the opinion be not
officially published."). But see Torres v. Union Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 505-10, 203
Cal. Rptr. 825, 829-33 (Ct. App. 1984) (disagreeing with Burlington Northern, but finding agreement
in good faith where it contained a $50,000 unconditional payment as well as a $150,000 guarantee).
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in some doubt. In addition to relying upon legislative approval of Mary Carter
agreements, the Burlington Northern court also relied upon the very broad standard
of good faith set out in a 1981 decision, Dompeling v. Superior Court.'9' The
Dompeling rule was that "bad faith is not established by a showing that a settling
defendant paid less than his theoretical proportionate or fair share of the value
of the plaintiff's case," but only by a showing of "tortious or other wrongful
conduct" by the settling parties. 92 In 1985, the California Supreme Court
rejected the Dompeling rule in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates,' 93 a
case that involved a conventional settlement, not a Mary Carter agreement.
The court in Tech-Bilt set out a multi-factor test, which included a determination
"whether the amount of the settlement is within the reasonable range of the
settling tortfeasor's proportional share of comparative liability for the plaintiffs
injuries.' '" 9 While it is too soon to know the ultimate impact of Tech-Bilt on
Mary Carter good faith determinations, 9 5 Tech-Bilt arguably rejects the Burlington
Northern line of cases that considered the settling defendant's avoidance of all
liability to be irrelevant.
An ad hoc approach to the good faith issue in Mary Carter cases, as followed
in Florida and now in California, presents several difficulties. Courts may be
called upon to make the good faith determination either before or after the
trial of the plaintiff's claim. 196 If the determination is made before the trial,
the court will not be able to consider collusive trial conduct, as did the Florida
court in Diaz.197 Also, the court will not know whether the settling defendant
will assume any actual liability under a Mary Carter agreement because the
ultimate payment by the settling defendant is not ascertainable until the conclusion of the litigation against the nonsettling defendants. The California Supreme Court in Tech-Bilt recognized that in determining whether a settlement

191. Burlington Northern, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 946-47, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 378 (citing Dompeling
v. Superior Ct., 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981)).
192. 117 Cal. App. 3d at 809, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
193. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
194. Id. at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.

195. Several California courts of appeal, applying Tech-Bilt, have found sliding scale agreements
in good faith. Riverside Steel Constr. Co. v. William H. Simpson Constr. Co., 171 Cal. App.
3d 781, 217 Cal. Rptr. 569, (Ct. App.) (suggesting, however, that sliding scale recovery agreements
are not "settlements" at all), review granted, 709 P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1985); Rogers &
Wells v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 3d 545, 220 Cal. Rptr. 767 (Ct. App. 1985); Abbott
Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1205, 218 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Ct. App.), review
granted, 709 P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1985); see also Comment, Sliding Scale Settlements: The
Need for a Minimum Contribution to Comply with the Reasonable Range Test for Good Faith, 19 Loy. L.A.L.
REV. 995 (1986) (suggesting that the Tech-Bilt reasonable range standard must encompass sliding
scale settlement agreements).
196. The issue may arise before trial on a motion to dismiss a crossclaim for contribution.
See, e.g., Florow, 502 F. Supp. 1; see also supra notes 167-77 and accompanying text (discussing
Florow). Also, some statutory schemes provide for a pretrial hearing to determine the good faith
or reasonableness of a settlement. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE 9 877.6 (West Supp. 1987);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. S 4.22.060 (West Supp. 1987); see also Harris, supra note 116 (discussing
statutory schemes).
197. See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
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amount is reasonable, courts may have to consider the information available
to the parties at the time of settlement. 19 While this approach is certainly fair
in ordinary cases, its application to Mary Carter agreements will mean blanket
approval of all these agreements in which the guaranteed amount is within the
reasonable range, regardless of whether the amount is ever paid. Evaluating
the good faith of Mary Carter agreements on the basis of the guaranteed amount
alone has been justly criticized because it still
permits shifting all liability to
the nonsettling defendant and "does not accord the equitable sharing concept
the consideration it deserves in our present tort system.'' 99
D. Mary Carter Agreements in a Tort System Without Joint and Several Liability
and Contribution
In the 1970s, the trend in tort law was toward adoption of contribution
among joint tortfeasors,2 0 and many believed contribution would solve the problem of Mary Carter agreements. 21 Thus, it seemed that shifting total liability
through a Mary Carter agreement, with no reduction in the plaintiff's judgment
and no contribution for the nonsettling defendant, would not become a widespread problem. The threat of contribution, however, like the threat of reducing
the plaintiff's judgment, has not entirely destroyed the attractiveness of Mary
Carter agreements because courts have not consistently
or uniformly applied
20 2
these doctrines to protect the nonsettling defendant.
20 3
Moreover, as a result of the movement to abolish joint and several liability,
a trend has now begun away from contribution. The latest development in tort
law seems to be a system of apportioning fault among the plaintiff and each
tortfeasor and holding each defendant liable for only his proportionate share
regardless of the other defendants' ability to pay. 20 4 Under such a system, there

198.
199.
200.

38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166-67, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
Sliding Scale Agreements, supra note 1, at 143.
The UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEAsORS ACT (1955) was adopted in North Carolina

and Tennessee in 1968; Alaska in 1970; Nevada in 1973; Florida in 1975; Ohio in 1976; Colorado
in 1977; Wyoming in 1978. 12 U.L.A. 61 (Supp. 1986). Illinois adopted a contribution system

in 1979. ILL.
201.

REv. STAT.,

ch. 70, § 302(c), (d) (1979).

See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.

202. See supra § II.C.
203. See Granelli, The Attack on Joint and Several Liability, 71 A.B.A. J., July 1985, at 60. During
1986, legislation eliminating or limiting the application of joint and several liability was proposed

or enacted in Florida and Illinois, 2 Civil Trial Manual (BNA) 284-86 (July 16, 1986); Hawaii
and New York, 2 Civil Trial Manual (BNA) 381-83 (Sept. 10, 1986); Utah and Wyoming, 2 Civil
Trial Manual (BNA) 167-68 (May 7, 1986). On June 3, 1986, California voters by public ref-

erendum approved Proposition 51, which limits the application of joint and several liability.

CAL.

1431.1 (West Supp. 1987). In a few states, the adoption of comparative negligence
in the 1970's was accompanied by abrogation of joint and several liability. See 3 F. HARPER, F.
JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 9, § 10.1, at 29.
204. See Granelli, supra note 203; Note, An Analysis of the Proposed Abrogation of California'sJoint
and Several Liability Doctrine - Is Abrogation the Answer to the Insurance Industry Crisis?, 8 WHITrIER L.
CIVIL CODE §

REv. 263, 263 (1986). In 1974, Professor Schwartz suggested that if comparative negligence is "to
fulfill its role of apportioning damages on the basis of fault, [the rule of joint and several liability]
must be abolished."

V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 105, § 16.7, at 260.
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is no need for a credit rule or contribution because no defendant is required
to pay another's share of the plaintiff's recovery.205
It is not clear at this time how far this movement will extend, but wherever
it reaches it makes Mary Carter agreements more inviting. The plaintiff entering
into such an agreement is, as always, guaranteed some recovery. The plaintiff
also secures assistance from the settling defendant, during the trial, in placing
maximum blame on the nonsettling defendant, minimum blame on the plaintiff,
and a high value on the plaintiff's injuries. In return, the settling defendant
limits his liability to a specific amount, or possibly eliminates all liability if
there is a verdict against the nonsettling defendant of sufficient size according
to the terms of the Mary Carter agreement. The absence of joint and several
liability of tortfeasors, therefore, serves only to enhance the attractiveness of
Mary Garter agreements.
III.

TOLERATING MARY CARTER AGREEMENTS

Most jurisdictions tolerate the use of Mary Carter agreements, even though
the courts acknowledge that a Mary Carter agreement threatens the fairness of
the trial of the settling plaintiff's claim against the nonsettling defendant. Courts
utilize various approaches in attempting to reconcile the existence of a Mary
Carter agreement with the nonsettling defendant's right to a fair trial.
A.

Admissibility of the Mary Carter Agreement

With regard to trial fairness for the nonsettling defendant, one of the most
harmful effects of a Mary Carter agreement occurs when the settling defendant
appears before the jury as a defendant, but testifies favorably to the plaintiff. 2 "

Because of the Mary Carter agreement, the settling defendant's real interest is
in favor of the plaintiff's recovery of a substantial verdict. While settlement
agreements generally are not admissible to prove liability, they may be admissible to prove the bias of a witness. 20 7 Most jurisdictions that accept Mary
Carter agreements have held that the agreement is admissible to impeach the
208
testimony of the settling defendant.
California's Proposition 51, see supra note 203, amends the California Civil Code to add 5
1431.1, which states in part that "defendants in tort actions shall be held financially liable in closer
proportion to their degree of fault." CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1431.1 (West Supp. 1987).
205. See Harris, supra note 116, at 108 n.137.
206. See supra notes 18-19 & 21 and accompanying text.
207. See infra note 217.
208. Reese, 55 Ill. 2d at 364, 303 N.E.2d at 387; Douglas v. GHR Energy Corp., 477 So.
2d 691, 691 (La. 1985); Johnson v. Moberg, 334 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Minn. 1983); Hegarty v.
Campbell Soup Co., 214 Neb. 716, 725, 335 N.W.2d 758, 764-65 (1983) (to impeach employees
of settling defendant); Bedford School Dist. v. Caron Constr. Co., 116 N.H. 800, 805, 367 A.2d
1051, 1055 (1976) (but amount guaranteed may not be disclosed); Cox v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 594
P.2d 354, 359 (Okla. 1978); see also infra text accompanying notes 236-37 (discussing Cox); General
Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 858-59 (Tex. 1977); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.5(2)
(West 1980) (quoted supra note 187); ef. Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 511 (9th
Cir. 1974) (when settling tortfeasor is participating in the suit as a party plaintiff, Mary Carter
loan receipt inadmissible to impeach either agreeing party). But see Barajas v. USA Petroleum
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The problem of trial unfairness, however, is not limited to the credibility
of the settling defendant. The agreement also affects the way in which counsel
for both the plaintiff and the nonsettling defendant present and argue their
cases. 2 19 For this reason, admitting Mary Carter agreements only for the purpose
of impeachment is not an adequate solution. In some cases, there may be no
witness to impeach. For example, in Marotta v. General Motors Corp.,210 the Illinois

Supreme Court held there was no error in the trial court's refusal to admit a
Mary Carter agreement where there was no proof that the settling defendant's
testifying employee knew of the agreement.2 11 A broader and preferable approach
taken by some courts simply permits the trier of fact to be informed of the
2
existence of the agreement and its terms.

12

A related problem that arises is whether the entire agreement can or must
be admitted. At first glance, it appears that it would be in the interest of the
nonsettling defendant to have the jury fully informed of the facts that explain
the interests and positions of all witnesses and parties to the litigation. In fact,
however, full disclosure may be an unpalatable antidote for the nonsettling
defendant. First, the disclosure of the amount and terms of the agreement may
be seen as prejudicial to the nonsettling defendant. Also, in a far from subtle
move patently aimed at barring full disclosure of the Mary Carter agreement,
the settling parties often resort to inclusion of statements in the agreement
condemning the nonsettling defendant or reciting the seriousness of the plaintiffs
injuries.2 " 3 To avoid having such prejudicial statements read to the jury, the
nonsettling defendant may wish to introduce only parts, or only the substance

Corp., 184 Cal. App. 3d 974,
-, 229 Cal. Rptr. 513, 521 (Ct. App. 1986) (trial court did
not abuse its discretion under CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.5(2) in determining not to disclose

Mary Carter settlement to jury).
209.
210.

See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
108 I1. 2d 168, 483 N.E.2d 503 (1985).

211. Id. at -,
483 N.E.2d at 507.
212. See, e.g., Sequoia Mfg. Co. v. Halec Constr. Co., 117 Ariz. 11, 24, 570 P.2d 782, 794
(Ct. App. 1977) ("[T]here are clearly circumstances in which Gallagher agreements should be
admitted into evidence or made known to the jury by way of instruction, for limited purposes.");
Imperial Elevator Co. v. Cohen, 311 So. 2d 732, 734 (3d D.C.A. 1975) ("The jury is entitled

to be advised of such an agreement since it relates to the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses
and their interest in the outcome of the case, as well as to conduct of counsel during the course
of the trial."), cert. denied, 327 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1976); General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 286 Md.

714, 730, 410 A.2d 1039, 1047 (1980) (jury must be informed "as to exactly what the circumstances
are between the parties"); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 557
(Minn. 1977); Corn Exch. Bank v. Tri-State Livestock Auction Co., 368 N.W.2d 596, 600 (S.D.
1985). But see Reichenbach v. Smith, 528 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1976) (no harmful error in refusing
to admit evidence of Mary Carter agreement, but better to permit cross-examination about the
agreement for impeachment).
213. See, e.g., Diaz, 475 So. 2d at 933-344 (terms of agreement were "self-serving and inflammatory"); Burkett v. Crulo Trucking Co., 171 Ind. App. 166, 178-79, 355 N.E.2d 253, 26061 (1976). In Burkett, the court stated:

As in the case at bar, the loan receipt agreement may be drafted with admissions and
accusations so damning to the non-participating co-defendant that the co-defendant is placed

in a dilemma. He must choose to suffer in silence damaging conduct at trial by the codefendant participating in the agreement, or he must choose to explain that conduct to
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of the agreement, while the plaintiff and the settling tortfeasor may insist on
all or nothing. 21 4 Most jurisdictions address this problem by holding that the
jury may be informed of only the substance of the agreement or only those
parts necessary to inform them of the fact of settlement and its contingencies. ' ,
While disclosure and admission into evidence is the solution to the Mary
Carter problem most favored by courts that have addressed the issue, this
judicial solution faces a potential barrier in some states. For example, Tennessee's version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act includes
a provision, not part of the Uniform Act, which seems to prohibit admission
of the agreement for any purpose. Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-11105(b) provides:
No evidence of a release or covenant not to sue received by another
tort-feasor or payment therefor may be introduced by a defendant at the
trial of an action by a claimant for injury or wrongful death, but may
be introduced upon motion after judgment to reduce a judgment by the
amount stipulated by the release or the covenant or
21 6 by the amount of
the consideration paid for it, whichever is greater.
The plain language of this statute, which is similar to that of statutes in other
jurisdictions, 27 seems to prohibit introduction of a Mary Carter agreement even
on cross-examination of a witness for the purpose of showing bias. It is probable,
however, that this statute was never meant to apply to impeachment of a witness
for the bias that results from his entry into a settlement agreement. 26 Moreover,
the trier of fact by offering into evidence the agreement with its statements calculated to
frame the offering party in the worst possible light.

Id., 355 N.E.2d at 260-61; see also Lur, 87 Nev. at 407, 488 P.2d at 352 ("[Plaintiff's] counsel
acknowledged the agreement itself might prejudice the jury, since it contains references to [plaintiff's]
damages, and to [nonsettling defendant's] liability, his insurance, and his insurance carrier's 'irresponsible position.' ").
214. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Sloan, 432 So. 2d 132, 133 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.
1983); Palmer v. Avco Distrib. Corp., 75 Ill.
App. 3d 598, 606, 394 N.E.2d 480, 487 (1979),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 82 Ill.
2d 211, 412 N.E.2d 959 (1980) (after nonsettling defendant alluded
to agreement on cross-examination of settling defendant, plaintiff was permitted to place entire
agreement before the jury, subject to limiting instruction).
215. General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 286 Md. 714, 728, 410 A.2d 1039, 1047 (1980);
Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 558 (Minn. 1977); Brown v.
Gonzales, 653 S.W.2d 854, 863-64 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); see also CAL. Cxv. PRoc. CODE S 877.5(2)
(West 1980) (quoted supra note 187); cases collected in Case Note, supra note 59, at 576 n.30.
216. Cf. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORs ACT (1955) § 4, 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975)
(quoted in full supra note 161).
217. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 163 (1964) ("Evidence of settlement with a
release of one or more persons causing the injury shall not be admissible at a subsequent trial
against the other person or persons also causing the injury."); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 604.01(4)
(West Supp. 1987) ("Except in an action in which settlement and release has been pleaded as a
defense, any settlement or payment referred to in subdivisions 2 and 3 shall be inadmissible in
evidence on the trial of any legal action."); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 885.285(2) (West Supp. 1986)
("Any settlement or payment under sub. (1) is not admissible in any legal action unless pleaded
as a defense.").

218. Cf. FED. R. EviD. 408, which prohibits admission of compromises and offers to compromise to prove or disprove liability, but which adds, "This rule also does not require exclusion
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given the lack of widespread awareness of Mary Carter agreements, a court
could reasonably conclude that the legislature did not intend the statute to apply
to such an agreement, and that juries, therefore, may be informed of its existence so they can appreciate the true positions of the parties before them.
B.

Disclosure of the Agreement

Admission of a Mary Carter agreement to preserve trial fairness cannot be
accomplished, of course, if the existence of the agreement is known only to the
settling parties. For this reason, and because of the ethical considerations discussed earlier, 19 courts that have addressed the problem have uniformly refused
to permit such agreements to be kept secret from the court and the opposing
party.
In some jurisdictions, either by statute or by judicial decision, disclosure of
a Mary Carter agreement to the court and to other litigants is required whether
or not a nonsettling defendant seeks disclosure of the agreement. 220 While not
all courts have required such automatic disclosure, all jurisdictions addressing
the question seem to concur that such agreements must be disclosed in response
2 21
to a properly framed discovery request.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b), and similar rules in many jurisdictions, 22 2 provide that parties "may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action." If a Mary Carter agreement is admissible evidence for purposes of
223
impeachment, or if it is otherwise subject to disclosure to the trier of fact,

when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of witness a
.... "; D. PAINE, TENNESSEE LAW OF EVIDENCE S 38 (1974) ("It should be remembered that a
witness called by the defendant can be impeached for bias if his claim was settled."); see also id.

209.
219.

See supra § II.A.2.
See, e.g.,

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.5(a)(1) (West 1980); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(1)
(1986); Mustang Equip., Inc. v. Welch, 115 Ariz. 206, 211, 564 P.2d 895, 900 (1977); Gatto v.
Walgreen Drug Co., 61 Ill.
2d 513, 520-23, 337 N.E.2d 23, 28 (1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936

220.

(1976); Johnson v. Moberg, 334 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Minn. 1983); Cox v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 594
P.2d 354, 360 (Okla. 1978); State ex rel.
Vapor Corp. v. Narick, 320 S.E.2d 345, 348 (W.Va.
1984); see also Guiding Principlesfor Cooperation in the Defense of Multi-Party Litigation, 24 FOR THE DEF.,

July, 1982, at 16, 18 (conclusion of Defense Research Institute that Mary Carter agreements are
acceptable only "where intransigent co-defendants refuse to consider settlement and where the agree-

ment is disclosed to the court and all counsel").
221.

See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Little, 276 Ark. 511, 514, 639 S.W.2d 726,

728 (1982); Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385, 387 (Fla. 1973); Grillo v.Burke's Paint Co., 275
Or. 421, 427, 551 P.2d 449, 453 (1976); Corn Exch. Bank v. Tri-State Livestock Auction Co.,

368 N.W.2d 596, 599-600 (S.D. 1985). See generally Comment, Blending Mary Carter'sColors: A Tainted
Covenant, 12 GONZAGA L. REv. 266, 277-78 (1977).
222. See, e.g., TENN. R. Crv. P. 26.02. Rule 26 also provides, "It is not ground for objection
that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." In the case of a Mary
Carter agreement, however, it is difficult to see how the agreement, if not admissible itself, would
leAd to the discovery of other admissible evidence.
223. See supra § III.A.
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it would seem to be relevant to the subject matter of the action and, therefore,
2 24
within the scope of discovery.
Mary Carter agreements are also relevant to the subject matter of the action
because the agreement may affect the nonsettling defendant's right to a reduction
of a plaintiffs judgment against him or his right to contribution from the settling
defendant.2 25 With regard to contribution, the Mary Carter agreement becomes
relevant to the action if and when, in a jurisdiction following the 1955 Revised
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, a settling defendant seeks to
defeat a nonsettling defendant's claim for contribution on the basis that the
Mary Carter agreement is a good faith settlement barring contribution.2 6 This
rationale for the relevance and discoverability of a Mary Carter agreement,
however, may not be apparent during the early stages of the litigation, either
because the nonsettling defendant has not yet asserted a claim for contribution,
or because the settling defendant answered the claim for contribution with only
a general denial.

27

The agreement also may be relevant and discoverable if the nonsettling
defendant seeks a reduction of a judgment against him on the basis of a Mary
Carter agreement. This, however, is a less likely basis for pretrial discovery of
a Mary Carter agreement. The issue of reducing a plaintiffs judgment may
be seen as relevant to the action only after there is a verdict against the non2

settling defendant.

28

If a Mary Carter agreement remains a secret from a nonsettling defendant,
it is probable that a trial against him will be unfair. Without knowledge of the
agreement, the nonsettling defendant is unable to challenge either testimony
biased by the agreement or the settling defendant's sham posture as a defendant.
Because of the importance of disclosure 229 and because the agreeing parties may
create barriers or delay if the nonsettling defendant must rely upon the ordinary
discovery process, disclosure of all Mary Carter agreements to the court and
to other parties should be required as a matter of course as soon as the agreement is consummated.

224.
11-105(b)
225.
226.

In Tennessee, however, this proposition is in doubt because of TENN. CoDn ANN. S 29(1980). See supra text accompanying notes 216-18.
See supra §§ II.B.-C.
See UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT (1955) § 4, 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975)

(quoted in full supra note 161); supra S II.C.
227.

Good faith settlement must be pleaded as an affirmative defense to a claim for contri-

bution. Concrete Sciences, Inc. v. Bassett, 449 So. 2d 300, 300 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1984); see FED.
R. Civ. P. 8(c). Liberal amendment of pleadings, however, is generally permitted. FED. R. Civ.
P. 15(a). But cf. CA.. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(d) (West 1980) ("The party asserting the lack of
good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.").
228. TENN. CODE ANN. S 29-11-105(b) (1980) (quoted supra text accompanying note 209) provides that a settlement agreement may not be introduced on the primary claim, but may be
introduced on motion to reduce the judgment.
229. In City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. App. 3d 856, 864-65, 222 Cal.
Rptr. 562, 566-67 (Ct. App. 1986), the court held that the mandatory disclosure requirement with

regard to sliding scale recovery agreements authorized by CAL. Civ. PROc. CODE § 877.5 (West
1980) prevents violations of the due process rights of the nonsettling defendant. See also suprg
notes 82-89 and accompanying text for discussion of ethical duties to disclose settlement agreements.
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C.

Separate Trials, Severance and Dismissal of the Settling Defendant

The disclosure and admission approach to controlling Mary Carter agreements has been criticized as being insufficient to cure the prejudice to the
nonsettling defendant. 230 Admitting the Mary Carter agreement into evidence
does not resolve several problems of unfairness in the trial process. Even if the
jurisdiction permits the nonsettling defendant to inform the jury of the agree2 31
ment for impeachment purposes or to disclose the parties' true positions,
courts permitting the settling defendant to remain a party defendant still may
enable the settling defendant to enjoy the advantages of that position to the
detriment of the nonsettling defendant. The settling defendant may still use
peremptory challenges to aid the plaintiff in jury selection, thus allotting more
challenges to the plaintiffs side of the litigation, and less to the defendant's,
than the applicable law provides. 2 2 The settling defendant may still be permitted
233
to use leading questions to cross-examine witnesses who are not really adverse.
Also, the continuing presence of the settling defendant may serve to block the
nonsettling defendant from removing a case to federal court when in reality
there is complete diversity of citizenship between those parties who are truly
adverse.

234

Because admissibility is an insufficient protection for the nonsettling defendant, some courts, while not banning Mary Carter agreements, refuse to permit
the settling defendant to remain in the case as a party defendant. 235 For instance,
in Cox v. Kelsey-Hayes Co. , 2 1 6 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held:
If a pre-trial agreement has settled the suit completely between plaintiff and one defendant, then that defendant should be dismissed as being
unnecessary to disposition of the case.
If the agreement does not absolutely settle the conflict, but rather
hinges on the amount of the verdict, the trial court should review the
circumstances of the agreement and either hold that portion of the agreement
granting agreeing defendant an interest in a large plaintiff's verdict unenforceable
as against public policy, or dismiss the agreeing defendant from the suit. In no

circumstances should a defendant who will profit from a large plaintiffs
verdict be allowed to remain in the suit as an ostensible defendant. If
agreeing defendant is dismissed, cross-examination affecting his interest
and credibility should protect the interest of non-agreeing defendant. If
agreeing defendant remains in the suit and the agreement has been de-

230. See, e.g., Reese, 55 Ill. 2d at 366-67, 303 N.E.2d at 387-88 (Schaefer, J., dissenting);
Lum, 87 Nev. at 411-12, 488 P.2d at 351-52 (1971); Case Note, supra note 59, at 581; Comment,
supra note 221, at 278-81.

231. See supra § III.A.
232. See supra note 17.
233.

See supra note 21.

234. See infra § III.E.
235. Mary Carter agreements have been found unobjectionable where the settling tortfeasor
has participated in the trial as a party plaintiff. Auto Village, Inc. v. Sipe, 63 Md. App. 280,
286, 492 A.2d 910, 913, cert. denied, 304 Md. 296, 498 A.2d 1183 (1985); Vermont Union School
Dist. No. 21 v. H.P. Cummings Constr. Co., 143 Vt. 416, 430, 469 A.2d 742, 750 (1983).
236. 594 P.2d 354 (Okla. 1978).
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dared void as against public policy, then the adversary nature of the
proceedings
has been preserved and the agreement is no longer rele23 7
vant.
Dismissal of the settling defendant serves to eliminate much of the trial
prejudice caused by these agreements. The settling defendant no longer has an
attorney participating in the trial who may use jury selection, examination of
witnesses and jury arguments to the plaintiff's advantage. 2 8 Of course, the
settling defendant may still appear as a witness, but, as the Cox court states,
admissibility of the agreement at least permits the nonsettling defendant to
expose to the jury the bias of the witness. 239 The plaintiff will then be no worse
off than with any other nonparty witness who has a known incentive to lie or
shade his testimony.
Similarly, some courts have suggested that separate trials or severance of
the plaintiff's claim against the settling defendant should be used to eliminate
the deception and prejudice that results from participation by the settling defendant. 240 In a simple Mary Carter case, however, severance should amount to
dismissal of the plaintiff's case against the settling defendant. If the settlement
agreement is treated as valid and all of its provisions given their intended effect,
there are no issues left to be tried on the severed daim. 241 Separate, rather
than severed, trials conducted without realignment of the settling defendant as
a party plaintiff would not remedy the problem of the settling defendant's trial
24 2
participation, because the settling defendant would remain a party at both trials.

237. Id. at 359-60; see also Unfair and Unnecessary, supra note 3, at 800 (dismissing settling
defendant is appropriate since no justiciable issue exists and it avoids collusion). Courts have also
indicated that voluntary dismissal of the settling defendant may be a condition of the court's
recognition of the agreement. Popovich v. Ram Pipe & Supply Co., 82 IMl. 2d 203, 210, 412
N.E.2d 518, 522 (1980) (giving effect to a Mary Carter loan receipt where the agreement "was
disclosed to the court, the contracting defendants were dismissed, and the court was not forced to
determine the liability of a sham defendant").
238. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text; see also Lubbock Mfg. Co. v. Perez, 591
S.W.2d 907, 919-21 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), in which the plaintiffs and settling defendant, comtemplating Mary Carter agreements, were granted severance from the claims against the nonsettling
defendant. After the agreements were consummated during trial, the settling defendant was not
permitted to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses and the nonsettling defendant was permitted to
recall and impeach any witnesses that had previously been examined by the settling defendant.
239. 594 P.2d at 359-60; see also Palmer v. Avco Distrib. Corp., 82 Ill.
2d 211, 215, 226,
412 N.E.2d 959, 961, 966-67 (1980) (settling defendants were dismissed before trial; proper to
cross-examine settling defendant about the agreement); Bistol Myers v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801,
805 (Tex. 1978) (Mary Carter agreement admissible to impeach settling defendant even though
plaintiff had non-suited claim against him before trial).
240. 284 So. 2d at 387; Burkett v. Cruo Trucking Co., 171 Ind. App. 166, 177, 355 N.E.2d
253, 259 (Ct. App. 1976) (separate trials). Unfair and Unnecessary, supra note 3, at 800-01, criticizes
this approach as inadequate because the nonsettling defendant, in a case in which he has brought
a crossclaim for contribution, will be forced "to participate in two separate proceedings, merely
because a co-defendant entered an unrighteous agreement to avoid liability."
241. This analysis, of course, demonstrates the absurdity of upholding the validity of a Mary
Carter agreement while still allowing the settling defendant to remain as a party defendant.
242. Modern rules of practice differentiate between severance and separate trials. Separate
trials under Fan. R. Civ. P. 42(b) result in one judgment, but "severed claims under [Fed. R.
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Nevertheless, in Hemet Dodge v. Gryder,2 3 an Arizona appellate court held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a severance
sought by the nonsettling defendant. The court cited City of Tucson v. Gallagher'
for the proposition that a Mary Carter agreement permits a plaintiff "to be
assured of some recovery, but without the disadvantage of having to try a case
with an 'absent' defendant. ' 24 - The court in Hemet Dodge was apparently referring to the Gallagher court's observation that dismissing the settling defendant
gives the nonsettling defendant's attorney a chance to argue to the jury that
the settling defendant is the liable party and that the plaintiff has sued the

wrong party. 246
The problem raised by the Hemet Dodge and Callagher courts is not unique
to cases involving Mary Carter agreements. The so-called "empty chair" defense is a strategy also used by nonsettling defendants in cases where the plaintiff
has entered into a conventional settlement with a codefendant . 2 7 The problem
arises when the nonsettling defendant argues not merely that the absent party's
conduct was the sole cause of the plaintiffs injuries, but when he argues that
248
the plaintiff ought to have sued the absent party, rather than him.
The solution to this problem, however, is not to retain settling defendants
as party defendants, but rather to permit the plaintiff to inform the jury of his
settlement with the absent party when the nonsettling defendant's argument that

Civ- P. 21] become entirely independent actions to be tried, and judgment entered thereon, independently." 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2387 (1971). In
separate trials, therefore, the settling defendant remains a party at the trial against the nonsettling
defendant. See Phillips v. Unijax, Inc., 625 F.2d 54, 56 (5th Cir. 1980) (state court order of
separate trials did not create diversity jurisdiction where it did not previously exist because the

nondiverse party remained a party to the suit); 3 J.

MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE

14.10,

at 14-101 to -102 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter 3 MOoRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE] (in the case of an
order for separate trial of a claim, prior determination of main claim is not final and appealable,
absent an order under FED. R. COy. P. 54(b), because the determination has adjudicated "fewer
than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties"). The settling defendant,
therefore, may have the right to participate in the separate trial of the plaintiff's claim against the
nonsettling defendant. See 3 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra at
14.19, at 14-99, 14-100.
Separate trials under FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) is a device used "for convenience or to avoid
prejudice"; severance under Rule 21 is generally used only to correct misjoinder of parties or
claims. 3A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 21.05 [2], at 21-43 (2d ed. 1982)
[hereinafter 3A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE]. In a Mary Carter case, therefore, the more appropriate
device would be separate trials because the purpose of divorcing the claims (if any claim exists
against the settling defendant) is to avoid prejudice, not to correct a misjoinder.
243. 23 Ariz. App. 523, 534 P.2d 454 (1975); accord Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Otis,
145 Ind. App. 159, 171-76, 250 N.E.2d 378, 388-90 (1969) (criticized in McKay, supra note 6,
at 232-33 n.6).
244. 108 Ariz. 140, 493 P.2d 1197 (1972).
245. 23 Ariz. App. at 530, 534 P.2d at 461.
246. See 108 Ariz. at 142, 493 P.2d at 1199.
247. Gutman, Adrance Sheet - See No Evil, 12 LITIGATION 43 (Summer 1986) (commenting upon
Rojas v. Lindsay Mfg. Co., 108 Idaho 590, 701 P.2d 210 (1985)).
248.

Id. In Rojas, the jury had been informed of the settlement and the nonsettling defendant's

counsel argued to the jury that the settlement evidenced that the settling defendant had caused the
injury. Id. at 43-44.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1986

45

Florida Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [1986], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[vol. :%,x,,xviII

the absent party should be present renders the information relevant. In some
jurisdictions, in fact, the jury ordinarily is informed of the plaintiffs settlement
with a third party, either because the jury has the task of deducting settlement
amounts from the judgment 249 or because the disclosure is deemed to minimize
the prejudice that results from the jury's speculations about the role of the
absent party. 20 Moreover, in Mary Carter cases, it is often the nonsettling
defendant - the party who typically uses the "empty chair" strategy - who
wishes to introduce the plaintiffs settlement for purposes of impeaching the
parties to the agreement or informing the jury of the parties' nonadverse po2 51

sition.
D.

Conflicts Between May Carter Agreements and the Real Party in Interest Rule

Some courts and litigants have questioned whether the real party in interest
rule is violated when the plaintiff who has entered into a Mary Carter agreement
proceeds as the sole party plaintiff to prosecute the claim against the nonsettling
defendant.2 2 As described below, depending upon how a jurisdiction construes
the real party in interest rule and the Mary Carter agreement, the result may
be that (1) the plaintiff is not a real party in interest and may not proceed
with his claim against the nonsettling defendant, (2) the plaintiff must join the
settling defendant as a party plaintiff, (3) the real party in interest rule requires
disclosure of the Mary Carter agreement to the jury, or (4) the real party in
interest rule has no effect upon the plaintiffs right to proceed alone in his
claim against the nonsettling defendant.
The real party in interest rule, as stated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
17(a), and similar state rules of procedure, provides that, "Every action shall
be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. " 2" A real party in
interest is a party "who, by the substantive law, possesses the right sought to
be enforced.' '254 The plaintiff who is a party to a Mary Carter agreement,

249. When the jury deducts settlement amounts, the jury is informed, of course, of both the
fact and the amount of any settlements with the plaintiff. See Annotation, Manner of Crediting One
Tortfeasor with Amount Paid by Another for Release or Covenant Not to Sue, 94 A.L.R.2d 352, 360 (1964).
250. See Greenemeier v. Spencer, 719 P.2d 710, 714 (Colo. 1986) (en bane) (although the
court and not the jury will deduct the amount of settlement from the verdict, the fact of settlement,
but not the amount paid, should be brought to the jury's attention, absent special circumstances);
accord Arhart v. Micro Switch Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1986). But see supra notes 21618 and accompanying text.
251. See supra § III.A.
252. Bolton v. Ziegler, 111 F. Supp. 516, 531 (N.D. Iowa 1953); Cullen, 211 Kan. at 374,
507 P.2d at 360; General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 286 Md. 714, 726, 410 A.2d 1039, 1045
(1980); Tober v. Hampton, 178 Neb. 858, 879, 136 N.W.2d 194, 207 (1965); Lum, 87 Nev. at
408, 488 P.2d at 350-51 (1971).
253. See, e.g., TENN. R. Civ. P. 17.01; see also 3A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note
242, 17.02 n.13 (listing state statutes and rules).
254. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 242, § 1543, at 643-44 (1971). In a case in
federal court in which state law provides the rule of decision, state law determines the substantive
right of a party to enforce a claim. Federal law then governs on the question of joinder. Id. S
1544.
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therefore, is a real party in interest in his suit against the nonsettling defendant
if he continues to possess his original claim against the nonsettling defendant.
A plaintiff whose claim has been fully satisfied generally is not entitled to
further enforce the claim. 2-5 Courts have expressed differing views with regard
to whether the plaintiff who has entered into a Mary Carter agreement has
been fully compensated. In Tober v. Hampton,'56 the Nebraska Supreme Court

held that the plaintiffs had been fully compensated for their injuries by the
Mary Carter loan receipt they obtained from the settling tortfeasor; thus they
were no longer owners of their claims. The court affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit on the grounds that the plaintiffs were not real
parties in interest. The court reached its conclusion by first deciding that the
loan receipt was not a valid loan. Rather, it was merely an attempt by the
agreeing alleged joint tortfeasor to settle the plaintiffs' claims and then impose
full liability on the nonagreeing defendant in contravention of Nebraska law
prohibiting contribution and indemnification among joint tortfeasors. 25 7 Once
the court determined that the plaintiffs had in effect settled and fully assigned
their claims, it followed that they were no longer real parties in interest. 25
The Tober court's analysis depended upon construing the Mary Carter agreement to be something that the parties never intended it to be - full compensation and assignment of the plaintiff's claim. Thus, the Tober opinion is
not particularly instructive regarding the application of the real party in interest
rule to cases where a Mary Carter agreement is given its intended effect. The
2 9
Supreme Court of Kansas, in Cullen v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway,
took a more realistic view of Mary Carter agreements and rejected the argument
3 F. HARPER, F. JA.MFs & 0. GRAY, supra note 9, § 10.1, at 30-32; W. PROSSER & W.
supra note 9, § 48, at 330.
256. 178 Neb. 858, 136 N.W.2d 194 (1965).
257. Id. at 879, 136 N.W.2d at 207; see supra § II.B. for other cases refusing to permit Mary
255.

KEETON,

Carter agreements for similar reasons. Tober was overruled in Royal Indem. Co. v. Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co., 193 Neb. 752, 229 N.W.2d 183 (1975), to the extent that Tober held negligent joint

tortfeasors not entitled to contribution.
258. Justice Boslaugh, concurring in Tober, would have dismissed the plaintiff's claim because
the settlement was full compensation and effected a release of the nonsettling defendants. 178 Neb.
at 880, 136 N.W.2d at 207. Justice Smith, dissenting, argued that the loan receipt in this case
should be treated no differently than loan receipts in the insurance context and, therefore, that
the plaintiffs were real parties in interest. Id.
In Reese v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 55 IlM.2d 356, 365, 303 N.E.2d 382, 387 (1973), Justice
Schaefer, dissenting, argued that enforcement of a Mary Carter loan receipt agreement
undermines, without even mentioning it, the long-standing doctrine that prohibits the as-

signment of a cause of action for personal injuries or for wrongful death. By the arrangement sanctioned in this case, one of two joint tortfeasors is permitted to buy from the
injured person or his administrator the cause of action as it relates to him, and then to
participate in the assertion of the cause of action against his co-defendants.
This argument has been rejected. See Cullen v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 211 Kan. 368, 374, 507
P.2d 353, 360 (1973); Biven v. Charlie's Hobby Shop, 500 S.W.2d 597, 598-99 (Ky. 1973). The
argument is of no significance where the claims at issue are assignable. See Webb v. Dessert Seed
Co., 718 P.2d 1057, 1067-68 (Colo. 1986). For a discussion of the issues of assignment, subrogation
and real party in interest in Mary Carter agreements see Unsettling Contributions, supra note 1,
at 139-42.
259.

211 Kan. 368, 507 P.2d 353 (1973).
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that a Mary Carter loan receipt rendered the plaintiffs no longer real parties
in interest. The court stated, "The deciding factor is whether the amount
received, whether denominated loan or payment, is full satisfaction or only
partial satisfaction of the loss." ' 260 The court then reasoned that because the
plaintiff's suit sought $36,926.61 and the loan receipt evidenced payment of
261
only $29,600.00, the plaintiff was permitted to bring the suit.
In the typical case involving a Mary Carter agreement, the damages claimed
by the plaintiff exceed the guaranteed or loaned amount. The opportunity to
recover more than the guaranteed amount, by obtaining the agreeing defendant's cooperation at trial, is a primary motivation for the plaintiff to enter into
such an agreement. The difference between potential and guaranteed recovery
also assures the agreeing defendant that the plaintiff will vigorously prosecute
the action against the nonagreeing defendant and thereby minimize the agreeing
defendant's actual liability. Thus, when a Mary Carter agreement is construed
as it was intended by the parties, the plaintiff remains a real party in interest
and may continue to prosecute his claim against the nonsettling defendant.
Even if the plaintiff who has entered into a Mary Carter agreement is
considered a real party in interest, a suit against the nonsettling defendant by
the plaintiff alone may be impermissible under the real party in interest rule
if the rule is construed to require that all real parties in interest join as party
plaintiffs and if the settling defendant is considered to be a real party in interest.
Through the Mary Carter agreement, a settling defendant acquires a beneficial interest in the plaintiffs claim because his ultimate payment to the plain26 2
tiff depends entirely upon the amount of any verdict the plaintiff recovers.
A real party in interest, however, is not merely a person with some beneficial
interest in the claim. Rather, it is a party who by the substantive law possesses
the right sought to be enforced, and not necessarily the person who will ultimately benefit from the recovery.2 63 The settling defendant, therefore, is a real
party in interest only if by virtue of the agreement he acquires a right to
enforce the plaintiff's claim.
Mary Carter agreements generally do not expressly assign all or a part of
the plaintiffs claim to the settling defendant or otherwise give the settling
defendant a right to prosecute the plaintiff's claim. 264 Nevertheless, one may
conclude that the settling defendant acquires a right to enforce the claim under
the doctrine of subrogation, if one reasons that the settling defendant's guarantee
26
or "loan" to the plaintiff discharges the nonsettling defendant's obligation. 1

260. Id. at 374, 507 P.2d at 360.
261. Id., 507 P.2d at 360.
262. The settling defendant's acquisition of a beneficial interest in the plaintiff's claim also
injects the issue of champerty into the Mary Carter arena. See supra S II.A.1. In Lum v. Stinnett,
where the court relied upon the doctrine of champerty in voiding Mary Carter agreements, see
supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text, the court also noted, but did not analyze, the real party
in interest issue. 87 Nev. at 408, 488 P.2d at 350-51 (1971).
263. See supra note 254.
264. But see supra note 258 and Alder, 324 F.2d 483 (discussed supra notes 146-51).
265. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 162 (1937), which provides: "Where property of one
person is used in discharging an obligation owed by another . . . , under such circumstances that
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It is by no means certain that the settling defendant is entitled to subrogation
under these circumstances. First, if the settling defendant is considered to have
made the payment or guarantee officiously, he may not be entitled to subrogation. 2 6 Second, subrogation may not be available if the settling defendant
has only partially satisfied the plaintiff's claim. 267 Third, in a negligence case
involving a Mary Carter agreement, giving subrogation rights to the agreeing
tortfeasor effectively gives contribution or indemnity to a settling joint tortfeasor,
a result possibly prohibited. 268 More importantly, the purpose of a Mary Carter
agreement is not to discharge the nonsettling defendant's obligation. Quite to
the contrary, the intent of the agreeing parties is that the nonsettling defendant
remain liable to the plaintiff for the full claim. If subrogation is not applicable
and if the plaintiff has not assigned his claim to the settling defendant, the
settling defendant will only be a beneficially interested party, and not a real
party in interest. In such a case, it is dear that the real party in interest rule
will have no effect on a suit brought by a plaintiff who has entered into a
Mary Carter agreement.
Assuming the settling defendant is considered to be a real party in interest,
either through assignment or subrogation, it is still not clear that the real party
in interest rule is violated in a suit brought by the injured party as the only
party plaintiff. While some courts hold that the rule requires joinder of all real
parties in interest, other courts hold that the rule requires only that a real
party in interest bring the suit.
The view that the real party in interest rule requires joinder of all real
parties in interest is found in the Seventh Circuit case of Wadsworth v. United
States Postal Service.269 In Wadsworth, the court stated that under Federal Rule
17(a), an insurer who has paid part of a plaintiffs loss is a real party in interest
and must be joined as a plaintiff. 2 0 There appear to be no reported decisions
requiring that under the real party in interest rule, a party who has settled
with the injured party through a Mary Carter agreement must be joined as a
party plaintiff when the injured party seeks to enforce his claim against the
nonsettling defendant. The view that requires joinder of all real parties in
interest is certainly open to criticism. 27 1 Nevertheless, if the settling defendant
the other would be unjustly enriched by the retention of the benefit thus conferred, the former is
entitled to be subrogated to the position of the obligee . . ...
"; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF REsTrrTUTION

§ 31 (Tent. Draft No. 2 1984).

266. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 162, comment b (1937); see Bolton v. Ziegler, 111 F.
Supp. 516, 531 (N.D. Iowa 1953) (because insurance policy of the settling defendant is one of

liability, subrogaton is not involved; settling defendant is not a real party in interest).
267. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 162, comment c (1937).
268. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 102 (1937); see supra § II.B.
269. 511 F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1975).
270. Id. at 65-66 (citing United States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 381
(1949)); see also Carpetland, U.S.A. v. J.L. Adler Roofing, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 357, 358-59 (N.D.
Ill.
1985) (following Wadsworth; joinder of plaintiff store's insurer required under Rule 17(a) where
insurer had reimbursed store for less than entire loss).
271. See 3A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 242,
17.09 [1.-I], at 17-94:
Since the original purpose of the rule was to overcome procedural barriers disallowing
suit by assignees, the rule should not now be applied to dismiss suits as of course, when
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is considered a real party in interest and his joinder is required by the real
party in interest rule or otherwise, the effect would be helpful in assuring a
fair trial for the nonsettling defendant. The jury would be aware of the settling
defendant's real posture and the settling defendant would not have the defendant's privileges with regard to jury selection, examination of witnesses and
argument.

272

An interpretation of the real party in interest rule similar to the Wadsworth
view was suggested in the context of a Mary Carter agreement by the Court
of Appeals of Maryland in General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki. 273 The Lahocki court,
however, did not require joinder of the settling tortfeasor as a party plaintiff,
but did require disclosure of the Mary Carter agreement to the jury. Reasoning
that "the policy of this State is for the trier of fact to have knowledge of the
real party in interest, ' 27 4 the court in Lahocki ordered a new trial because of
failure to disclose to the jury a Mary Carter agreement between the plaintiff
2 72

and one defendant.

The view that the real party in interest rule does not require joinder of all
real parties in interest is found in the Fourth Circuit opinion in Virginia Electric
& Power Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.2 76 Construing Federal Rule 17(a), the

court held that in the context of partial subrogation between an insured and
its insurer, there are two real parties in interest and the insured subrogor was
entitled to bring suit for the entire loss in its own name.2 77 The court reasoned
that the effect of nonjoinder of the other real party in interest - the insurer
- should be analyzed under Federal Rule 19, not Rule 17.278 The court did
note, however, that in a case of complete subrogation where the insurer has
recompensed the insured for its entire loss, the insurance company would be
the only real party in interest and would be required to sue in its own name.2 79
Under this latter view of the real party in interest rule, a Mary Carter
agreement construed as the parties intended has no effect on a lawsuit brought
by the injured party as the sole plaintiff. Even if the settling defendant is deemed
to be a real party in interest, his joinder as a plaintiff is not required because
the plaintiff, who has not fully assigned his claim or been fully compensated,
remains a real party in interest who may assert the entire claim, even though
he may be obligated to reimburse or release the agreeing defendant in some
proportion to the final award.
brought by assignors, unless the court finds the assignee is indispensable under Rule 19
and the assignee is not joined.
Id. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 242, § 1543, at 646 ("[T]he question of who should
or may be joined in the action must be determined under Rule 19 and Rule 20 rather than Rule

17(a).").
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
(1949)).

See supra S III.
286 Md. 714, 410 A.2d 1039 (1980).
Id. at 727, 410 A.2d at 1045.
Id. at 726, 410 A,2d at 1047.
485 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974).
Id. at 84.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 83 (citing United States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 380-81
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In summary, the real party in interest rule should have no impact on lawsuits
in which the plaintiff has entered into a Mary Carter agreement, even though
joinder of the settling defendant as a party plaintiff may be helpful in reducing
prejudice to the nonsettling defendant. Because a Mary Carter agreement is
not intended to fully compensate the plaintiff, the plaintiff remains a real party
in interest. Further, without an enforceable assignment of the plaintiff's claim
to the settling defendant, the settling defendant is not a real party in interest
with regard to that claim. If the settling defendant is an additional real party
in interest through an assignment in the Mary Carter agreement, his joinder
as a plaintiff is not required under the more widely-held view of the Fourth
Circuit that the real party in interest rule does not require joinder of all real
parties in interest.
E.

Preserving the Nonsettling Defendant's Right to Remove to Federal Court

As discussed above, jurisdictions that tolerate the use of Mary Carter agreements employ various devices to ensure that the agreement does not prejudice
the nonsettling defendant's right to a fair trial. Many jurisdictions rely upon
disclosure and admission of the agreement and permit the settling defendant
to remain a party defendant. If, however, trial fairness includes the nonsettling
defendant's right to remove the case to a federal court when there is a proper
basis for federal jurisdiction, then a Mary Carter agreement may unfairly deprive the nonsettling defendant of this right.
A defendant is entitled to remove a case from state to federal court if it is
a case "of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.' '21 Complete diversity of citizenship between the plaintiffs and the
defendants in a suit creates original federal subject matter jurisdiction. 2 1 In a
case in which there is diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff and the
nonsettling defendant, but not between the plaintiff and the settling defendant,
the presence of the settling defendant in the suit can be the only barrier preventing the nonsettling defendant from removing the case to federal court. An
incidental effect of an undisclosed Mary Carter agreement thus may be to defeat
the nonsettling defendant's right of removal. Conceivably, defeat of removal to
federal court may even be a primary goal behind the structuring of Mary Carter
settlements in some cases.
There are no reported decisions addressing the problem of removal in the
particular context of a Mary Carter agreement, but federal courts have considerable experience with the problem of plaintiffs attempting to defeat removal

280.

Removal jurisdiction is created by 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982), which provides in part:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought
in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction,

may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
Id. When the sole basis for original jurisdiction in the federal court is diversity of citizenship,
removal is available only if the defendants "properly joined and served" are not citizens of the

state in which the action is brought. Id. § 1441(b).
281. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
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by various devices, including joinder of nondiverse defendants against whom
they have no legitimate claim.182 As a result, there are several doctrines that
may be invoked by a nonsettling defendant to accomplish removal notwithstanding the naming of a nondiverse settling defendant as a party defendant
in the complaint. The applicable doctrines depend upon whether the settlement
agreement is consummated prior to or subsequent to the commencement of the
action.
The right to remove is initially determined by the existence of federal subject
matter jurisdiction at the time the suit is commenced. 283 In determining whether
diversity jurisdiction exists, federal courts "look beyond the pleadings, and arrange the parties according to their sides in the dispute. '284 A corollary to this
doctrine of realignment 2 5 is the doctrine of fraudulent joinder, which provides
that removal is not defeated by the joinder as a defendant of a nondiverse
person against whom the plaintiff has no bona fide claim. 286 Thus, in the case
of either a Mary Carter agreement or a conventional settlement between the
plaintiff and the sole nondiverse defendant prior to commencement of the action,
the suit should be considered removable at the time of its commencement because the plaintiff has settled with that defendant and no longer has a bona
fide claim to assert.

28 7

Another possibility in the case of a Mary Carter agreement is to analyze
the situation as one of realignment of the settling defendant as a party plaintiff
because the settling defendant's ultimate interest is for the plaintiff to succeed
in his claim against the nonsettling defendant. 288 This analysis would be ap282.

See generally C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 31 (4th ed. 1983).
283. When the basis for removal jurisdiction exists at the commencement of the suit, diversity
of citizenship must exist at commencement and at the time of removal. 1A J. MooRE & B. RINGLE,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.161 [L.-3], at 267-68 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter IA MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE].

284. City of Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Say. Fund, Safe Deposit, Title & Trust Co., 197
U.S. 178, 180 (1905).
285. A defendant, in his removal petition to the federal court, may seek realignment to justify
the existence of diversity and removal jurisdiction. See Pacific Ry. v. Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289
(1879); Broidy v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 186 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1951); Thompson v. Bankers
& Shippers Ins. Co., 479 F. Supp. 956 (N.D. Miss. 1979); 1A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 283, at 256. Procedures for removal are specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1982). In addition
to the complaint, the federal court will consider affidavits and depositions submitted in support
and in opposition to the removal petition. B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549 (5th
Cir. 1981).
286. C. WRIGHT, supra note 282, at 173. See generally 1A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 283, at
0.161 [2]. The question of bona fide claim will be decided with reference to state
law. "[T]here can be no fraudulent joinder unless it be clear that there can be no recovery under
the law of the state on the cause alleged." Parks v. New York Times Co., 308 F.2d 474, 478
(5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964).
287. A petition for removal ordinarily must be filed within thirty days after the defendant
receives the initial pleading. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1982). If a settlement was consummated prior
to commencement of the suit, but is not discovered until later, however, the defendant may then
remove the action, see id., and the agreement may be considered in determining the parties' original
positions. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 282, at 157.
288. In determining the propriety of removal on the basis of diversity of citizenship, the
characterization in the state court action of a party as a plaintiff or defendant is not controlling
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propriate, however, only in cases in which the settling defendant has acquired
a right to enforce the plaintiff's claim, which is probably true only if the
agreement contains an enforceable assignment. 289 Whether the situation is one
of fraudulent joinder or realignment, removal should be allowed whenever a
plaintiff commences an action in which the only nondiverse defendant has entered into a Mary Carter agreement with the plaintiff.
If a settlement with the only nondiverse defendant is entered into after the
suit has commenced, a defendant will not be able to remove the case on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction existing at the time the suit commenced. Nonetheless, a voluntary dismissal of the sole nondiverse defendant renders a case
removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), which provides in a pertinent part:
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a petition for
removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant,
through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion,
order or other paper from which it may first 290
be ascertained that the
case is one which is or has become removable.
A settlement agreement with the sole nondiverse defendant, entered into and
revealed during litigation, is arguably an "other paper from which it may first
be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable." By
reason of the settlement, the plaintiff has arguably voluntarily dismissed his
claim against the settling defendant. 291 If the settlement is a Mary Carter agreement giving the settling defendant an enforceable claim against the nonsettling
defendant, the case is nonetheless removable because the settling defendant
292
should now be realigned as a plaintiff.
Even without formal receipt of a Mary Carter agreement or formal dismissal
of the nondiverse settling defendant, the conduct of the plaintiff and the settling
defendant during trial may make removal possible. An illustrative case is Heniford v. American Motor Sales Corp.,293 a case that may not have involved a Mary
Carter agreement, but in which the plaintiffs' counsel, in closing argument in
state court, told the jury with regard to the nondiverse codefendant, "[D]on't
give a verdict against Ralph. We're not actually suing Ralph because we've
found out now - found out when this case came up, that Ralph was telling

because the meaning of the federal removal statute is for the federal courts to decide. 1A MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 283, at 256. Thus, the fact that the state court may permit the

settling defendant to appear as a defendant in the suit should not be determinative.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 262-68.
290. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1982). A plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of the nondiverse defendant
will render a case removable, but an involuntary dismissal will not. 1A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 283, at 279-80.
291. See DiNatale v. Subaru of Am., 624 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (removal sustained
on the basis of an agreement that the plaintiff would seek no recovery against the nondiverse
defendant, and the nondiverse defendant would abandon its motion for summary disposition and
appear and remain throughout the trial).
292. See supra notes 284-85 & 288-89 and accompanying text.
293.

471 F. Supp. 328 (D.S.C. 1979).
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the truth by the records in this particular case. ' 29 4 The federal district court
held that the case became removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) when the
plaintiffs' counsel, by directing the jury not to return a verdict against the only
nondiverse defendant, "in effect, dismissed their claim against this defendant. '295
It is a sad commentary that federal court jurisprudence is so well equipped
with doctrines to combat the wiles of attorneys seeking to either create or defeat
diversity jurisdiction contrary to the reality of the litigation. 2 6 While these doctrines nevertheless appear sufficient to assure that Mary Carter agreements, if
disclosed, will not deprive a nonsettling defendant of his right to a federal
forum, they do require an expenditure of court and attorney time in litigating
the removal issue in federal court.
IV.

SHOULD MARY

CARTER AGREEMENTS

BE TOLERATED?

As demonstrated in section II, Mary Carter agreements defeat the policies
underlying all systems of allocation of liability among tortfeasors used in the
United States today. Mary Carter agreements are used purposely to defeat
any system of equitable sharing and to shift liability to the nonsettling defendant
through manipulation of the trial process. One effect of a Mary Carter agreement on the trial process can be to present to the jury a sham of adversity
between the plaintiff and one codefendant, while these parties are actually allied
for the purpose of securing a substantial judgment for the plaintiff and, in some
cases, exoneration for the settling defendant. 297 With regard to equitable sharing,
a Mary Carter agreement, while not reducing the plaintiffs claim against nonagreeing defendants, allows and induces the plaintiff to pursue the nonsettling
defendant alone for the entire claim. 29 8 In addition, where contribution is ordinarily allowed, a Mary Carter agreement may permit the settling defendant
to avoid his duty of contribution to the nonsettling defendant. 299
Thus, when Mary Carter agreements are permitted, the relative liability of
tortfeasors is not determined according to the policymakers' idea of fairness and
the results of an adversary trial. Rather, the allocation is determined by the
cleverness of some of the parties in manipulating the trial process and in avoid-

294. Id. at 332. The court did not reveal why the plaintiffs did not simply dismiss their claim
against Ralph. One can only speculate that Ralph was kept in the suit to defeat removal jurisdiction
or that a secret Mary Carter agreement was in effect.
295. Id. at 333. In response to the plaintiffs' argument that the literal requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 1446(b) were not met because no "paper" existed from which it could be ascertained
that the case had become removable, the court stated that the purpose of the "paper" requirement
is only to initiate the thirty day removal period. Id. at 335.
296. In Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941), after discussing the doctrine
of realignment, the Court stated, "Litigation is the pursuit of practical ends, not a game of chess."

Other courts have made similar statements about Mary Carter agreements. See Daniel v. Penrod
Drilling Co., 393 F. Supp. 1056, 1060 (E.D. La. 1975) ("Courts are not merely arenas where
games of counsel's skill are played. Even in football we do not tolerate point shaving.").
297.
298.
299.

See supra notes 9-22 and accompanying text.
See supra § II.B.
See supra § III.C.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol38/iss4/1

54

Entman: Mary Carter Agreements: An Assesment of Attempted Solutions
1986]

MARY CARTER AGREEMENTS

ing the rules of settlement, release, and contribution. Moreover, it is likely that
Mary Carter agreements are most attractive to, and more frequently used by,
the more culpable of the codefendants.5 °° Shifting liability through a Mary Carter
agreement, therefore, is especially antithetical to equitable sharing because the
shift is more often in the direction of the less culpable party.
Why, then, have not more courts followed the lead of cases such as Lum, 30 1
Cullen,"" and Alder, 30 and taken steps to eliminate these agreements? The most
frequent rationale expressed by the courts is the notion that Mary Carter agreements facilitate settlement of litigation.3 0 4 That rationale is highly questionable.
Mary Carter agreements normally require the plaintiff to continue to pursue
the nonsettling defendant and often give the settling defendant the right to veto
any proposed settlement between the plaintiff and the nonsettling defendant. 0
In this scenario, settlement with the nonagreeing defendant is less likely because
the plaintiff will demand a higher figure than he otherwise might expect from
the nonagreeing party. This is true because to fulfill the settling defendant's
purpose of shifting liability, the Mary Carter agreement requires the plaintiff
to refuse settlements with other defendants that are lower than an amount agreed
to by the settling defendant.-" Also, because the agreement provides the plaintiff
with an assured recovery, the plaintiff has little to gain from accepting a settlement offer from the nonsettling defendant that is not considerably above the
amount of the Mary Carter guarantee, even though the remaining defendant
0
may make a generous offer.1

7

300. See infra text accompanying note 310; Palmer v. Avco Distrib. Corp., 82 Il. 2d 211,
234, 412 N.E.2d 959, 970 (1980) (Ryan, J., dissenting):
[T~he use of the loan agreement tends to throw the entire loss upon the less blameworthy
party because the more blameworthy party will be willing to offer more in the pre-trial
auction for the opportunity to enter into a loan agreement and thus hopefully to escape
liability altogether.
Id. (citation omitted); see Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1205,
-,
228
Cal. Rptr. 250, 253 (Ct. App.), review granted, 709 P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1985) (during
settlement negotiations involving all the parties, defendant who subsequently entered into a Mary
Carter agreement with the plaintiff was willing to shoulder 70% of the proposed recovery).
301. See supra notes 39-49, 82, & 95-99 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
304. Slaughter v. Pennsylvania X-ray Corp., 638 F.2d 639, 641 (3d Cir. 1981) (Pennsylvania
law); Reese, 55 Ill. 2d at 363, 303 N.E.2d at 386 (1973); Jensen v. Beaird, 40 Wash. App. 1, 10,
696 P.2d 612, 618 (1985) (citing Reese). Contra Florow, 502 F. Supp. at 5 ("In no way has this
agreement saved this court or these parties one minute of court time or one dollar of litigation
expenses."); Reese, 55 Ill. 2d at 367, 303 N.E.2d at 388 (1973) (Schaefer, J., dissenting); Scurlock
Oil Co. v. Smithwick, No. C-4838, slip op. at 3 (Tex. Nov. 26, 1986) (LEXIS, States library,
Tex file) (Spears, J., concurring) ("Mary Carter agreements make further ligitation [sic] more
likely.").
305. See supra notes 10-11.
306. See supra notes 10, 14 & 150.
307. See supra note 14. In Eubanks & Cocchiarella, supra note 3, at 21-22, the authors argue
that because of the uncertainties inherent in jury trials, the plaintiff is amenable to settlement with
the nonagreeing defendant if the settlement amount equals or exceeds the guaranteed sum in the
agreement. This argument fails to recognize that once the plaintiff has a Mary Carter agreement,
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A recent California opinion, arguing that Mary Carter (sliding scale) agreements encourage settlement, stated that few multi-defendant cases go through
to trial once such an agreement has occurred.308 If and to the extent that
nonagreeing defendants are encouraged to settle in such situations, one must
then consider the reason. Mary Carter agreements may have the effect of forcing
defendants into unreasonable settlements for fear they will be subject to both
an unfair trial and, under California's treatment, the prospect of bearing the
entire burden of a verdict for the plaintiff, without any credit for the settlement
30 9
or any contribution from the settling defendant.
In deciding whether to permit Mary Carter agreements, courts should consider not simply whether these agreements encourage settlement, but more importantly, whether they do so in a manner fair to all parties. As a Washington
court reasoned:
We also believe that the use of [a Mary Carter agreement] has a
potentially coercive effect that should not be countenanced by the judiciary. This would be particularly true in a situation in which the
liability of the settling defendant is relatively dear, while the liability of
the litigating defendant is not. The more culpable defendant is in a
position to force the less culpable defendant to either litigate, and risk
the possibility of bearing the burden of the entire judgment, or settle
- thus, coercing a contribution. While it is the policy of the law to
encourage settlements, this policy should not be applied to the detriment
of possibly innocent parties.310
Finally, Mary Carter agreements do not simplify the litigation. As demonstrated
in section III, the agreement itself and its impact on the parties' positions
becomes an additional issue that must be dealt with at trial and considered by
31
the jury.Mary Carter agreements, particularly the loan receipt variety, have also
been defended on the grounds that, as early interim settlements, they provide
an injured plaintiff with funds to pursue his claim.3 12 The argument that Mary
Carter agreements should be tolerated because the plaintiff acquires litigation
funds depends upon the unjustified assumption that the nonsettling defendant

the uncertainty of trial provides less incentive to settle. The plaintiff's minimum recovery is guaranteed regardless of the trial results and he stands only to gain by going to trial. In addition, the
nonsettling defendant is unlikely to offer an amount far in excess of the guarantee amount if the
nonsettling defendant continues to consider the settling defendant to have a duty to contribute to
the settlement. The argument also fails to address the unfairness of shifting all liability to the
nonsettling defendant. If the plaintiff accepts a settlement with the nonsettling defendant for the
guarantee amount or more, the settling defendant will have successfully shifted all liability to the
nonsettling defendant.
308. Riverside Steel Constr. Co. v. William H. Simpson Constr. Co., 171 Cal. App. 3d 781,
791, 217 Cal. Rptr. 569, 575 (Ct. App.), review granted, 709 P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1985).
309. See supra notes 186-99 and accompanying text (discussion of California cases).
310. Monjay v. Evergreen School Dist. No. 114, 13 Wash. App. 654, 661, 537 P.2d 825,
829 (1975); see also supra note 300.
311. See supra 9 III.A.
312. See supra note 59.
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is a highly culpable party who is being intransigent about settlement. 313 A recent
criticism by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court314 with regard to another settlement device 315 applies to this assertion. The court stated, "Policies favoring
settlement help to reduce the burden upon the judicial system. Such policies
are adopted primarily for the benefit of the judicial system as a whole, not for
the purpose of allowing plaintiffs a quicker or more substantial recovery of
damages to the detriment of defendants. "316
One can also discern, and sympathize with, a feeling in some opinions that
it is too difficult to comprehend the ramifications of these agreements. On the
assumption that the agreements may have some, albeit unknown, legitimate
function, courts are reluctant to ban them per se. 317 Rather, exercising a sense
of judicial restraint, courts tolerate Mary Carter agreements, attempting to
negate trial unfairness by requiring disclosure of the agreement to the court,
counsel, and sometimes the jury and, at least in Oklahoma, requiring dismissal
318
of the settling defendant as a party defendant.

There is reason, however, to doubt the adequacy of the protections commonly afforded the nonsettling defendant. First, it is difficult to know whether
juries that are informed about a Mary Carter agreement are capable of appreciating its effect when the settling defendant continues to participate in the
trial as a defendant. There is considerable potential for juror confusion, as well
as other prejudice to the nonsettling defendant, if the settling defendant plays
a defendant's role at trial."" Second, even if the settling defendant is dismissed

313.

See Eubanks & Cocchiarella, supra note 3, at 21-22 (Mary Carter agreement encourages

a highly culpable nonagreeing defendant to take a "realistic" and "serious" approach to settlement).
But cf. supra notes 300 & 310 and accompanying text (culpable defendants may use Mary Carter
agreements to coerce contribution by codefendants whose culpability is not so clear).
314. Lavoie v. Celotex Corp., 505 A.2d 481 (Me. 1986).
315. Lavoie involved a Pierringer arrangement. Id. at 482; see supra note 160.
316. 505 A.2d at 483.
317. See Bass, 749 F.2d at 1158 n.7; Maule Indus., Inc. v. Rountree, 264 So. 2d 445, 447
(4th D.C.A. 1972) ("Obviously, the number of variations of the so-called 'Mary Carter Agreement'
is limited only by the ingenuity of counsel and the willingness of the parties to sign, and we,
therefore, feel that we can neither condone nor condemn such agreements generically."), rev'd, 284
So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1973); Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 41 Md. App. at 608, 398 A.2d
at 507 (Ct. Spec. App.) (court declined to "brand Mary Carter, like Hester Prynn, without regard
to the hows or whys of her conduct or what good or harm resulted by what was done"), rev'd,
285 Md. 714, 410 A.2d 1039 (1980); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d
548, 558 (Minn. 1977) ("It is not proper or desirable for this court to condone or condemn types
of settlement agreements generically. Rather, we must examine them on a case-by-case basis and
assess their validity and effect."). On the other hand, in Burkett v. Crulo Trucking Co., 171 Ind.
App. 166, 176-77, 355 N.E.2d 253, 259 (Ct. App. 1976), the court ordered separate trials as a
remedy for the Mary Carter problem, but noted,
[W]e cannot avoid the realization that a modicum of resourcefulness will permit a future
Burkett [plaintiff] and a future McMurry [settling defendant] to enter into a loan receipt
agreement circumventing this holding to the same detriment of a future Crulo [nonsettling
defendant]. Considering the loan receipt agreement's potential for abuse, we have, by this
holding, applied a Band-Aid to an abcess.
318. See infra § III.
319. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
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from the suit, as the Oklahoma Supreme Court has required, 320 the Mary Carter
agreement is still a strong inducement to perjury on the part of the settling
defendant who appears as a witness. If such perjury occurs, the nonsettling
defendant may be unable to expose it through cross-examination or introduction
of the agreement for impeachment purposes.3 21 In addition, the nonsettling
defendant's exercise of his right to remove the case to federal court may be
complicated by the presence, even temporarily, of the settling defendant as a
3 22

nondiverse party defendant.

As more trials are affected by Mary Carter agreements, the proposition that
such trials can be fair to the nonsettling defendant is put to the test. Courts
that have rejected the ban on Mary Carter agreements imposed by the Nevada
Supreme Court in 1972323 may wish to reconsider that court's assessment that
although it did not know how the jury would react if informed of the agreement,
it did know the nonsettling defendant "had the right to litigate his case without
hazarding the prospect that such considerations might affect the jury's verdict. 324
Such reconsideration appears to have begun in Texas, where Mary Carter
agreements have been permitted and have been admissible at trial for some
time. 325 In a recent decision, Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 326 the Texas Supreme
Court held that a trial judge may exercise his discretion to refuse to apply
collateral estoppel or issue preclusion to a judgment rendered in a case in which
a Mary Carter agreement was in effect. The court explained:
The resolution of [whether to allow issue preclusion or collateral estoppel effect to the jury findings in the prior case] requires us to weigh
the public policy of encouraging settlements against the obvious prejudicial effects on a non-settling defendant in a "Mary Carter" situation.
Such a settlement means the plaintiff and the settling defendant inevitably
gang up on the non-settling defendant and jointly point the finger of
liability. The settling defendant likewise argues for high damages, something usually foreign to defendants' advocacy.
Although the non-settling defendant may advise the jury of portions
of the "Mary Carter" agreement, as we held in Simmons, we nevertheless
conclude that a jury verdict in those situations is one having the potential
of being obtained without full and fair litigation .... Notwithstanding for
public policy reasons, we permit "Mary Carter" agreements32 7in spite of
the potential skewing of a non-settling defendant's liability.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Spears stated that Mary Carter agreements do

320. See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
321. See supra § III.A.
322. See supra § III.E.
323. Lum, 87 Nev. at 402, 488 P.2d at 347; see supra § II.A.
324. 87 Nev. at 412, 488 P.2d at 353.
325. See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977); Unfair and Unnecessaly, supra note 3.
326. No. C-4838, slip op. at 11 (Tex. Nov. 26, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Tex file).
327. Id. at 10-11.
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not promote settlement and are inconsistent with a fair trial. 328 He concluded,
"I am ready to hold Mary Carter agreements void as against public policy.''329
V.

CONCLUSION

The best that can be said of Mary Carter agreements is that they are more
trouble than they are worth. In order to give a plaintiff and codefendant the
freedom of making whatever arrangement they wish in settling their dispute,
the civil litigation system and the nonsettling parties must pay the price of
risking perjury, confusing juries and permitting evasion of the various allocation
systems designed to ensure equitable sharing of liability among tortfeasors. Because it is not possible to ensure a fair trial for the nonsettling defendant when
a Mary Carter agreement is involved, and because these agreements do not
fairly encourage settlements, there is no reason to permit a Mary Carter agreement to determine the relative liability of those responsible to the plaintiff.
Rather, public policy and an untainted adversary trial should determine the
distribution of liability among the potential obligors.
The best solution is outright prohibition of Mary Carter agreements. Neither
one of the less direct approaches to eliminating these agreements is entirely
satisfactory. Refusing to consider the Mary Carter agreement as a bar to contribution against the settling defendant is an uncertain remedy because the
settling defendant may be exonerated at trial from most or all liability to the
plaintiff, and hence from contribution to the nonsettling defendant. 3 0 Reducing
the plaintiffs judgment by the guarantee amount is a more effective remedy,
but still permits the settling parties to gamble on a large verdict against the
nonsettling defendant. 3 ' In both approaches, it is still possible that a nonsettling
defendent may be victimized by an unfair trial because the settling parties are
motivated by the Mary Carter agreement to cooperate in shifting all liability
to the nonsettling defendant.
Judicial resources are not well spent in trying to keep one step ahead of
settlement devices designed to contravene a jurisdiction's policy choices with
regard to distribution of liability among obligors. 3 2 The best solution to the
Mary Carter problem is to prohibit all settlements between a plaintiff and a
potential obligor in which the settling obligor's ultimate extent of liability to
the plaintiff depends upon the amount of the plaintiff's recovery from other
obligors.

328. Id. at 3-4.
329. Id. at 2.
330. See supra § 11.C.
331. See supra § II.B.
332. The expenditure of judicial resources is illustrated by the considerable number of recent
California cases struggling with the issue of whether a Mary Carter ("sliding scale") agreement
is a good faith settlement that relieves the settling defendant from a duty of contribution. See supra
notes 190-95.
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